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ABSTRACT
The present study is an attempt to analyse the evolution of the relationship between the 
Turkish Armed Forces and the Republican People’s Party (RPP) between 1960-1983. The 
analysis will be done by refemng to the three militaiy interventions of 1960, 1971, and 
1980. The reason for focusing on the three militaiy interventions is that they reveal to a 
great extent the nature o f civil-militaiy relations.
The origins o f the great alliance between the RPP and the Turkish military that lasted 
until the 1970s can be traced back to the War o f National Independence. The RPP, which 
was closely identified with Kemalist state, shared with the Turkish military the role o f  
guardianship o f the republican regime. However, after Ismet Inonu’s death in 1973, the 
RPP under Bulent Ecevif s secretary-generalship gradually dropped Kemalism and took a 
position totally opposed to the basic tenets of the republican regime, thus moved the party 
from its traditional role as the guardian o f the state. Consequently, the military rule o f 
1980, unlike the one of 1960, reflected the collapse of the grand coalition between the 
RPP and the Turkish military.
ÖZET
Bu çalışmanın amacı 1960-1983 yılları arasındaki dönemde Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi 
(CHP) ve Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri (l'SK) arasındaki ilişkinin evrimini incelemektir. Bu 
inceleme yapılırken 1960, 1971 ve 1980 yıllarında gerçekleştirilen askeri darbelere 
odaklanılmasmın sebebi bu darbelerin asker-sivil ilişkilerini büyük ölçüde açığa 
vurmasıdır.
CHP ile TSK arasında oluşan ve 1970lere kadar süren yakınlığın temelleri Kurtuluş 
Savaşına değin uzamnaktadır. Kemalist devlet ile büyük ölçüde özdeşleşen ve 
Cumhuriyet rejimini koruma ve kollama görevini TSK ile paylaşan CHP 1973te İsmet 
İnönü’nün ölmesiyle parti başkanlığına seçilen Bülent Ecevit’in liderliğinde 
Kemalizmden gitgide kopmuş ve Cumhuriyet rejiminin temel prensiplerine tamamen ters 
düşen bir konuma girerek geleneksel görevinden uzaklaşmıştır. Sonuç olarak 1980 askeri 
yönetimi 1960dakinin tersine CHP ile TSK arasındaki yakınlığın tamamiyle bozulduğu 
gerçeğini yansıtmaktadır.
I owe special debt o f gratitude to my supervisor Prof Dr. Ergun Ozbuduii for his valuable 
comments throughout the preparation of the thesis. I am also grateful to the other 
members o f the examining committee, Prof Dr. Alimet Evin and Assoc. Prof Nur Bilge 
Criss for their helpful comments.
I also wish to express my gratitude to my dear father who never hesitated to help me 
whenever I need him.
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CHAPTER I; INTRODUCTION
1.1 THE ROLE OF THE TURKISH MILITARY
In its most general sense, tlic 'furkish people are heirs to a strong tradition o f military' 
predominance as an arm of the community. The military interventions to the political life in 
Turkey in 1876, 1908, 1913, 1960, 1971, and 1980 reflect this predominance in both the 
Ottoman Empire and in the period after the years o f struggle for independence following 
the First World War. The army during the Ottoman Empire shared political power as an 
important part of the ruling class. In the Kemalist period, although the army was formally 
separated from politics, it was again an important force behind the scene. After 1961, with 
the formation of the National Security Council the army could be considered as ‘de jure’ 
institutionalized part of the e.xecutive power.
An important characteristic of the Ottoman Empire was its strong military base. In fact, 
the military partly consisted of the fiefholders who had no right to establish hereditary 
rights on their lands. Another part that made up the militaiy were the Janissary corps 
which occupied an important political position in the imperial structure. The institution o f 
the devşirme involved the drafting of young boys from the Christian population, their 
successful conversion to Islam and training to serve the Empire. The Ottoman Empire, 
composed of the Sultan at the center together with his civil and military bureaucrats, had a
strong centralized state authority. 'I'lic military had been intimately associated with the 
state so that one could not think of the state without the army or vice-versa.
The militaiy has been the major force behind the implementation of the reforms 
throughout both the Ottoman state and the Republic. However, as the Empire declined, 
the Janissaries became an obstacle to the reform efllbrts designed to save the collapsing 
structure of state and society. This led to the establishment of a new, European-style army 
alongside the Janissaries at the end of eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth 
centuries. As Rustow indicates:
The political modernization of Turkey occurred for the most part under militaiy 
aegis. The “New Order” proclaimed by Sultan Selim III (1789-1807) when he first 
undertook a program of Westernization consisted of a new army. The final victoiy of 
constitutional and representative principles came in 1908, as a result of a threatened 
military rebellion. A decade later, Mustafa Kemal(Ataturk) and other generals 
transformed the Ottoman Empire into a modern nation-state. Thus, for nearly two 
hundred years, the soldiers had been Turkey’s foremost modernizer.'
The 19th century saw the implementation of reforms in education in the army. However, 
this created a reaction by the conservatives within the army and these conservatives began 
to see themselves as the vanguard o f enlightenment, committed to political reforms and 
also to technical innovation. Consequently, Sultan Abdulaziz was overthrown and 
Turkey’s first constitution was introduced in 1876. This was considered to be an 
important source of inspiration and historical legitimation for the subsequent interventions 
in the 20th century.
' Fnink Tachau and Molin Hcpor. "The Slate. F'olitics. and ihe Mililaiy in Turke> .'' ( 'onipamiivc I’oliiics 
10(1983). 19. Quoted from Fdi.stow.
Tlie military also played an important but indirect role in the upheavals of the early 20th 
century that began with the Young Turk revolution in 1908. Although the young olTicers 
had directed the revolution, they did not opt to step openly in power. The disastrous 
experience of the Young Turks in political involvement (though series of 
pronunciamentos and coups) led to the Ottomans’ disastrous defeats in the Balkans in 
1912-1913. In the aftermath of the severe defeat in the World War I, the Ottomans saw 
the dismemberment of their territories, i.e. the collapse of the Empire.
“Having acted as the determinants of the empire’s political destiny in 1908 and 1909, the 
army became almost totally enmeshed in politics.”" The army was no more in a neutral 
position as it took side in political conflicts. They became dependent on civilian politicians 
and institutions in order to maintain power. Their involvement in politics led to their 
weakening and almost losing national independence.
It was at this point that Mustafa Kemal emerged as a political and military leader. He and 
his associates believed that the goals o f national security and modernization necessitated 
the existence o f order and tranquillity in the country and the existence o f peace in the 
external world. These were the most important preconditions o f the national good. Thus 
they saw themselves as the guardians o f the national ideals. Following his victory and the 
proclamation of the Republic, Atatürk attempted to separate the militaiy from the ordinaiy 
conduct of political affairs. ' He forced his associates, as well as the opposition leaders to 
choose either political or military careers. This was followed by an official action of
■ William Halo, Turkish Polnic s aiul the Military (London: Roiillcd,"c, 1994). 33.
persuading the Parliament to Ibrbid the military oHicers to stand for election unless they 
resigned from the army. While doing this Mustafa Kemafs aim was both to prevent the 
militaiy from exercising direct political inlluence and to prevent them from being alTccted 
by the political trends w-hich is a characteristic feature of stable political regimes. Also the 
military Penal Code made it an offense for any soldier to join a political organization, 
participate in demonstrations, or write or speak in public on political topics. In 1946 and 
in 1950, the electoral law was altered so as to disenfranchise all oHicers, soldiers and 
cadets. For Atatürk the military and the politicians had to have different functions. The 
military should stay outside politics and should engage in only safeguarding the nation 
from external enemies while the political elites should elevate the Turkish nation to the 
level of contemporary civilization.
The preservation of stable relations between the military and civilians were carefully kept 
intact during the Kemalist Republican rule. A major factor preserving this stable 
relationship was the military background of the top leaders involved since Mustafa Kemal 
himself was the president of the Republic until his death, and later İsmet İnönü also served 
as both the president and prime minister. Therefore although the military was separated 
from civilian authority, it was still the dominant hand on the stage.
Another indication for the incomplete removal of the military' from politics was the fact 
that the military commanders sometimes continued the Ottoman tradition o f acting as 
pi'ovincial governor s. The young officers were encouraged to think of themselves as the
Tachan and Heper. "The Stale." 19.
ultimate guardians o f both Atatiirkism and his principles, which was going make a crucial 
long-term effect on the events that would follow.
After the death of Atatürk, İnönü also remained loyal to Atatiirk’s principle of keeping the 
army under civilian control. The decision o f adopting multi-party democracy with its 
principles was taken in 1945-46 by ismet İnönü after consulting the military chiefs and 
obtaining their approval. In order to get the approval of the army, İnönü had to assure 
them that the political panics would not be allowed to violate Atatiirk’s reforms. In this 
context Kemal Karpat argues that:
İnönü told the army chiefs that they had a duty to preserve the democratic order. In 
other words, the military, besides retaining their positions as custodians of the state, 
were entrusted additionally with the task of guarding the state’s newly established 
democratic order, although direct involvement in politics was still strictly forbidden as 
part of Atatiirk’s legacy. Thus the Turkish democracy came into existence with the 
express consent and backing of the military.’
Although İnönü tried to preserve Atatiirk’s principles of keeping the army out of politics, 
the political education that was received by the young officers did not resemble that of the 
other armies. Being an officer in Turkey was more than just a job, it was a national duty 
and was the guardianship of the state.
The Turkish military have always been a highly educated and organized social group that 
has high-esteem and prestige in the eyes of the people. Their mission is to defend the 
nation from external enemies and they are always ready to sacrifice themselves for the
' Kcmal Karpal. ‘Tiirkisli Democracy at Impasse: Ideology. Parly Polities and llie Third Mililaiy 
Inlei'veiilion." Jmcniaiioiial Journal o f Turkish Studies 2( 19tS 1), 11.
protection of the Republic. Their professionalism is accompanied by feelings o f honor, 
discipline, uniformity and the self-image of being the savior of the Republic.
As it is presented above, the institutionalization of the guardianship role of the military has 
occurred due to three factors. The first was the close identification of the Ottoman army 
with the state. The second was the a.s.suming of the military the role as being the vanguard 
of enlightenment based on the adoption of Western ideals. The third is the fact that during 
the early Republican regime, the military was kept under the control o f the civilian 
authority, confining them to the role o f protecting the country only from external threats 
as well as internal in case the internal security of the country was in danger.
After a survey of the historical background of the Turkish military, I will now analyze the 
relationship between the army and the Republican People’s Party by looking at how close 
this party was to the guardianship role adopted by the militaiy will be analyzed.
1.2 THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE REPUBLICAN PEOPLE’S PARTY(RPP)
1.2.1 THE BIRTH OF THE RPP
The Republican People’s Party was founded on 9 September 1923 to affect the reforms 
Atatürk had in his mind Its origins can be traced back to the Turkish War of 
Independence(1919-1922) In fact, it was organized as a successor to the Defense of 
Rights Society for Anatolia and Rumelia to resist the Greek and the Allied invasions in the
War of Independence. However, these societies could be considered to be 
coordinated and united througliout tlie nation. The most impoi tant factor tliat united tliem 
was their opposition to the invaders and the collaborationist policies of tlie Sultan, 
otherwise they were divided on almost every other issue. “ ...There were radical reformers 
and political conservatives, secular-minded intellectuals and men of religion, even a few
members o f communist leanings.”
In 1924, a group among Mustafa Kemal’s close collaborators formed the Progressive 
Republican Party that had more conservative views on the subject o f social reform. 
However, Atatürk soon began to see it as an obstacle to rapid reform. The Sheikh Said 
revolt that broke out in the Eastern Anatolia in Februaiy 1925 put an end to the first 
multi-party experience on 4 March 1925. The closing of the Progressive Party led to a 
period of virtually unhindered RPP power until the establishment of the second opposition 
party in 1930.
The Free Party (FP) was created again by Atatiiik’s close collaborators and in ninety-nine 
days it became the forum for all dissidents of all complexions. Initially, Mustafa Kemal 
himself wanted the establishment of this party since he believed in a pluralistic, democratic 
political system. However, all the pluralistic elements had to be republican and modernist- 
progressive. Furthermore the FP was also going to provide a check on the RPP. The party 
began to pose a direct challenge to the RPP in four months’ time. The leadership of the 
RPP indicated that this opposition wasctually against Mustafa Kemal himself and against
Ergiin 0/biidun. "The Nalurc of llie Kemalist Political F^egime." \w Aiaiiirk: Founder o f a Modern
his reforms/’ Thus the FP was dissolved since it revealed that tlie country was not ready 
for a multi-party system.
The RPP, with the two exceptions mentioned above, can be said to have ruled single 
handedly, tolerating little resistance to its policies o f rapid social, economic, and political 
change. After 1931 the RPP gave prominence to the issues of reform and change and 
made efforts in expanding its organization throughout the country by recruiting additional 
members to the party. In the convention of 1931, ismet İnönü asserted that the RPP was 
“...a republican and populist organization and...these characteristics reflected the basic 
tendency and capability of the nation as a whole."’ For İnönü, Turkey was going to reach 
the level o f contemporary civilization by establishing a ‘populist’, ‘nationalist’, 
‘republican’, ‘secularist’, and ‘reformist’ state. With the incorporation o f ‘etatisnv the six 
principles became the part\ ideology and the six arrows the party emblem. Again, in the 
same convention, the issue of popularizing the reforms were discussed. The party had to 
eliminate old habits and traditions, teach elite the techniques of democratic government 
and build the links between the mass o f people and modernization. They had to develop 
policies that would provide popular challenge to political leaders at certain levels. In order 
to achieve cultural modernization, the People’s Houses (and People’s Rooms in villages) 
were established with the aim of educating people in agriculture, homemaking, initiating
State, eds. All Kazancigil and Ergim Özbııdım (London: C: Hurst. 1981). 80-81.
” Kenial Karpat. "The Republican People's Party. 192.V1945." in Political Parties and Democracy in 
Turkey, ed. Metin Hcperand .lacob M. Landau ( WBC Print. LTD. Bridgend. 1991). 51.
■ Ibid/ 52.
group activities, libraries and movies and providing education on political issues that 
would serve to prepare the nation for modernization.^
1.2.2 THE PARTY IDEOLOGY
Among the si.\ principles of the party ideology, ‘nationalism’ meant to ‘save the country 
from foreign invasion and thus to preserve the nation’s identity and culture.’ However, by 
1923, the RPP redefined the term so as to include in it the notion o f progress while 
retaining its moral character and independent identity. Some members o f the party, notably 
Recep Peker, pointed to the need of providing the countiy with a creed that would bring 
the people into action on behalf o f the new regime and guarantee its survival.
The principle o f ‘secularism’ was stated as a matter o f conscience that should be 
separated religion from worldly and political affairs. However, according to Kemal 
Karpat, the term was adopted by the party to supplement the principle o f ‘nationalism’, i.e. 
“...to rid of its Islamic-Ottoman historical content and help re-orient it towards new 
g o a ls .U n d e r  the RPP rule the term became the justification for the authoritarian 
measures imposed on the occasions of religious threats. Thus the religious activities were 
taken under control by the state by placing the directorate o f Religious Affairs under 
government authority.
 ^Wnlter F. W'ciker. The Turkish Revoluiion J 960-1961; Asf>ecis o f Mi/ifary Polifics (Wcsipoi'i. 
Coiiiiecticiil; Greenwood Press. 196.^ ). 0.
' Karpal, *Tlie F^epiiblican.“ 5 v
The doctrine of 'populism’ expressed the will for popular participation in political 
decisions. The slogan "by the people” and “for the people” defined the status of the 
government in both the political and economic spheres. The populists were progressive in 
political and social terms, but could not be considered traditionalists in cultural terms. 
During the RPP rule, populism eventually became to stress popular sovereignty and 
equality before the law, and rejection of class conflict."’
Etatism mainly expressed the reinforcement of the policy of cultural reform as it 
strengthened the hand of the government over the economy. One of the proponents of the 
idea of strengthening the |xnver of the party authority was Recep Peker (the secretary 
general of the RPP between 1923 and 1936). These type of attempts made by the radicals, 
later on led to the fusion of the party and the state. The radical etatists opted for the view 
of establishing public economic enterprises where they felt it to be necessary. However, 
there was also a liberal group who favored to limit the establishment of such enterprises to 
areas that were abandoned by private investors. The ousting of Recep Peker was a sign on 
the part of Mustafa Kemal to eliminate the excessive authoritarian stance o f the party and 
the regime.
After the death of Atatürk in 1938, the RPP elected ismet İnönü as the Party head who 
was to the greatest extent committed to the six principles o f the party and who had a good 
reputation in the eyes of the militaiy due to his being a close associate o f Atatürk and a
I') A.,Ozbiidim. "The Nature." <SX.
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national hero o f the War of Independence. He believed in pluralist multi-party democracy, 
since in 1945 he liberalized the Turkish political system and allowed the establishment of 
an opposition party.
1.2.3 THE SOCIAL BASIS OF THE
7’he analysis o f the social basis of the RPP reveals that the party has been born out of an 
alliance between the central military-bureaucratic -intellectual elite and local notables. The 
factors contributing to such alliance can be explained in terms of the local Defense of 
Rights societies that were led by militaiy officers and government officials. These officers 
and officials also needed the support of the local notables since there was no other chance 
to mobilize the people or the sources for their mission during wartime. However, these 
local notables did not seem to give consistent support during the struggle.
Apart from the local notables, another source for the mobilization o f local popular support 
for resistance were the scholars of Islam {ulema) and the heads of Islamic brotherhoods 
{seyhs). Like the local notables, the religious leaders were also divided among themselves 
in terms o f the support they gave to the resistance against the invaders. There were some 
religious leaders who sided with the Sultan and his government in Istanbul. Thus it could 
be concluded that the nationalist movement was a heterogeneous one in nature. Another 
point to be mentioned is that it is also impossible to discern class interests in this coalition
I I
as to who supported tlie Sultan and vvlio did not since the differences in tlieir social 
backgrounds cannot be identiiled."
For Ergun Özbudun, the secularizing relbrins such as:
...the abolition o f the C’aliphate and of the Ministry of Şeriat, the closing of religious 
schools, the abolition o f the Şeriat courts, the adoption of Western codes of law, the 
closing o f the derviş convents and the ban on the activities o f Islamic brotherhoods 
(tarikats), the adoption of the Latin alphabet and international numerals, the banning 
of the traditional Muslim fez headgear... put an end to the wartime co-operation 
between nationalist officials and religious elements.'“
The alliance that continued during the single party years was one between the military-
bureaucratic elite at the national level, and small-town and rural notables at the local level
that depicts the strength of both the military-bureaucratic elite and the local notables
within the social composition of the RPP. However, the strength of the alliance mainly
between the military-bureaucratic elites and the landed interests cannot be attributed to the
social and economic factors but to the political necessities created by the period of
National Independence War.'·'
At this point, the relationship between the RPP and the civil bureaucracy should also be 
mentioned. One of the important actions of İnönü was his concentration o f all powers in 
government rather than in the party. Thus as time passed on, the civil bureaucracy began 
to play a larger role in the polity. During the single-party years, the political party 
functions were so much fused with civil bureaucracy that when the Democratic Party came
"Ibid.. 8.T 
Ibid.. 84.
Ibid.. 84-86. Also sec Fero/ .Ahmad. The Turkish Tixpcriiiierif hi Tk'iiuicracv. 1950-1975 (London 
Hnrsl. lor Royal Inslidiio of Iniernaiional rMTaiis. \Vest\iow Press. 1677). 2
to power in 1950, tliey were going to claim that they represented ‘the people as against 
the bureaucracy’..'·'
As the alliance between the RPP, the militaiy and bureaucracy goes back to the period of 
National Independence War, hence the continuation o f this alliance after the regime has 
been consolidated should not be a matter o f surprise. In fact, the decision of İnönü to 
allow the establishment of opposition parties after consulting the army was an action of 
assigning the military the role of guardianship of the new regime. The outcome was the 
identification of the military with the republican state and Atatiirk’s reforms. This attitude 
preceded the imposition on the Turkish armed forces by law the duty of defending the 
Republic of Turkey against both its external and internal enemies and watching over its 
fortunes.
So how can one relate the guardianship role the Turkish military has assumed with the 
interventions they made in the political system during the following years? According to 
Metin Heper, each time the Turkish military decided to intervene, their assuming power 
has been due to the rtiling parties’ disregard for the rules of political democracy that led to 
political tensions, rise of political polarization and erosion of law and order. In these 
circumstances, the military warns the politicians pointing to the need of less polarization 
and more cooperation between them. When these warnings are not taken into account 
seriously, the military directly assumes power."*
' '  Mctin Hepor. 'I'hc Stale Iraditinn in Turkey (Walkingtoii. England: The Eodicn Press. 1985). 75. 
Ibid.. 8.5-84.
1.5
The purpose of this ih’'>is is i·) e\|)laiii the c\'olutit)n of the lelationship between the 
Republican People's lhui\ and liie I'urkish inililaiA throughout the |)criod 1960-1983. The 
research questions 'o be addiessed are: 1 low (k'es the alliance between the military and the 
RPP reflects itself in the polities ol the 1960s?, What is the role oi'the change in the RPP 
leadership in the di-ieritn ation of this alliance'.? What were the reasons for the breakdown 
of this alliance in the l''7().^■’, Mow do the three military inteiwentions in I960, 1971, and 
1980 relleei the :eiati(':isli:ji nf the military and the RPP',^
During this rese ’r ;l', m,i:nl\ ;i content analysis of both the primar\· (such as parliamentary 
speeches of the paıtç· leadei  ^ dui ing the period concerned, and memoirs of the army 
officers from \snnous echei:.)nsi tttid secondare· (as several books and articles written 
concerning the re.o'arch to,p.ic) sottrees will be made. Itt addition to these, an interview 
with a former at n-iv oflicei regarding the subject will be iticorporated
The theoretical i'a:as of this master's thesis will be the works td'important scholars as S. 
E. Finer (1'762', Samuel llumiiiglon , E. Nordlitiger, and (i. O'Donnel. Within that 
broader theoretical cotitext. 1 \s ill also combine the works of some well-known students of 
Turkish politics such as Hi gun Ozbudun, Metin Heper, Fratik Tachau, George Harris, 
Kemal Karpat. \' '^iΠiatu I lale \\ alter Weiker, Feroz Ahtnad, atid Utnit Cizre Sakallioglu.
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1.3 THEÜRr.;Tir:.AL B.A.SI.S lOK CIVIL-MIU'I ARY Rr.-LA'1'IONS
Many scholaıs liiu'i,· focused on cilher tlıe nıilitaıy oi' ihe .society in order to search for the 
reasons ol'military intcr\emions. flie wave of military interventions that the developing 
notions faced during the 1960s has been a valuable arena of research and many 
comparative studie  ^ ha\ e been conducted in order to see the dilTerences of the role of the 
military in those nations and in the developed Western nations.
It is evident that military inteiwntions cannot be e.xplained only due to the internal 
dynamics of the militaiy 'fhe processing of the political system should also be taken into 
account if the military is unde research. The reason for examining the relations between 
the RPP and the militaiy b\ focusing on the three military interventions is that they reflect 
how difticult it was to consolidate a system in which the rules of the game are not 
complied with and that they reveal to a great extent the nature o f the civil-military 
relations.
According to Ümit Cizre Sakallioglu, the coming of the civil-military relations to the phase 
of a military· inieivenlion can be analyzed from three paradigms:The first paradigm 
examines the social and political conditions that lead to military interventions. An 
important factor put forth by this paradigm is that the most important reason for the 
occurrence of military intervention is the inability of the civil-political institutions to meet 
the demands of the masses that stem from social and economic development. The second 
important focus of this paradigm relates the weakness and inelTectiveness of the political
l.s
institutions \o tli(-ii· beinu considered illegitimate by the masses; and this point necessitates 
to look at the poliilcal cuhui e of these societies. The third important factor related to this 
paradigm is the lar-t that a society in which neither the institutions nor the leaders are 
considered to be. ill.'gitiiiiaie contains in itselfalso its own antidote, i.e. the militaiy as the 
strongest inslitU'ion. .Accoiding to Sakallioglu, this attitude, in a way legitimizes military 
interventions sirce dicx bring about stability It also gives the military the responsibility of 
protecting the s';it.· as well as the socio-economic and political order.
Some of the Tnrhish scholais aiiproach to military interventions in Turkey in a way 
resembles the aoi'udc mentioned above. According to these scholars, the most reliable 
institution that p otects the state regime, and order is the militaiy. However, in flirther 
discussions scholais seem to be divided among themselves, .A considerable number of 
these scholars focus on the military’s arbiter position in a positive manner.'^ They also 
indicate that the problems laced in a democrac\ stem from the civilians but not from the 
military. Thus the onl\ concern of the military is to protect the national good against 
private good.
In contrast to this attitude, there are also some scholars who put the blame on the external 
dependency of Turkish capitalism and reflections of this dependency on the internal social-
Ümit Ci/io Sakalh'rdir , I' o ''-Jii Hi^idcri: lîir IkHcnnn Anainmisi (Istanbul: Helisim Yayinlari, 1993), 
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political arena i his approach siir'ycsts the ci\ilians' inelcrcncc ol relying on the army 
rather than on chonoci acN ''
The second paiadigm througli which tlie military interventions can be analyzed, looks at 
the militai)· itsell' and examines its organizational features. According to Samuel 
Huntington, the de cree that the military is more involved in its own technical task, i.e. the 
degree of its proiV sionalism is disproportionately related to the ti equency of its tendency 
to intervene into tlie political s\>tcm. '1 he greatei' the |)rofessionalism, the less the military 
is involved in p dilics ' ' I lowex er. Ozbuduniin alidates this hypothesis on the basis of the 
I960 militaiy iiV' i ention In lOoo. the Turkish military was a highly professional, one but 
its being a high'\· profesionalized a.rmy did not inhibit it from intervening into the political 
system, 'fhus ' ...the 'lurkish coup of I960 suggests that even a highly professionalized 
army may find itself in a situation which makes militar>· intervention almost inescapable.”"''
Another way of looking at the military itself has been hypothesized by S. E. Finer who 
relates the frequency of military interventions to the nature of political culture. According 
to Finer, there are four lev els of political culture; I) In the countries with “mature political 
culture the military intervention may occur at the level of influence where the military 
only tries to influence the civ ilian authorities by risking rejection of their advice. This level
Sakallioghi. Al'-Onhi llisnil, ri. U-l."'.
Samuel Hunhngi'.'ic Tin· SuLhcr ml·! i!w Suiic: '¡he '¡hemy inu! Practice aft 'ivil-Militaiy Relations 
(New York: Kandc:’i I louse Viiii lee BomI. Edition. 19()4). 7n-7S. S.t-SŞ.
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can be coiisicleri'd lo be constitiilional and leuilimate since it accepts the supremacy of 
civilian power. ·'
2) In countries v iih a developed political culture ', there is a resistance for military 
intervention and i? is not consideied to be leuitimate 'fhe level of intervention is either 
influettcc or hloi kniail. I’here is the possibility of the violent ousting of the government; 
however, these oc  ur iarel\· and are unsuccessful, d'he military acts from behind the scenes 
since the civil insiiuition.-; ha\e obtained public support."“
3) In countries \ . itb a "low political culture" legitimacy is of some importance but is rather 
fluid. The l elated lex els are either hhickwall. c/is/.>lacc/>iciil or siipplcwlmerit and the 
methods max' ranсe from "threats of non-cooperation or xiolence towards the civilian 
authorities, faikn e to defend the cix ilian authoiities against violence or violence.”"'
4) In countries with “minimal political culture”, legitimacy is not important at all. Here, the 
characteristic lev el to which the nfilitary intervention is relegated is either the displacement 
o f the civilian government or the supplanlment of the civilian regime by the military.^“*
Finer places Turley in the set of countries with a low political cu ltu re .H o w ev er, 
accordinsi tci 0/1 i:dun. militarx interventions in furkev have not occurred due to the low
■' S. E. Finer, ¡'he \ hin on the Hnr\eh,i. k: The Ro/e o/'ihe Mihinry in I'olnicx ( London: Pinter Publishers. 
1988), 77-7S 
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level o f poliliciil ¡n.st¡luli(ín;ili/.al¡on lii fad, the Re|niblic of Turkey was successful in 
achieving a balancr- between "a relatively high degree of political institutionalization and a 
moderate rale of social inobilizalionT Also, Turkish political parties are among the best 
organized, highly centialized and disciplined ones \shen compared to other countries in the 
underdeveloped wwild, ■ I'hus it is clear that the Turkish Army, unlike the armies in many 
other developin’’ ( ouniiies. did not m o\e into a power vacuum which might have been 
created by the mui' piiciiw lluidiiw and incoherence of political grou|)s,’'“^’
The third paradigm ma\ be called to mind b\' the Argentine political scientist Guillermo 
O ’Donnell in R'/d who introducetl the term ■"bureaucratic authoritarianism.”"’ O ’Donnell 
observed the v\.!vc ol' mililaig· interventions in .Argentina, Chile, Llruguay and Brazil and 
came up with an economic explanation for them
During the Id.^Os both .Argentina and Brazil were able reach to a high industrialization 
level. The ' Import-Substitution based Industrialization" (ISl) economic progammes 
adopted by the governments in these countries were able to bring about high profit levels 
for both the industrialists and the urban working classes. However, as time passed, 
economic crisis became evident due to rising intlation and balance-of-payment 
deficiencies. Th·.' strata which was most affected by this crisis were the urban middle and 
the working classes. The fear that these classes might rebel led the technocrats of the 
countiy to encourage militáis intersentions since they ssere not able toconciliate the lower
-■ Ibid.. 9't
■"Ozbudiiii. / ■';··/·’ '/( ■<!' u:·.· \ !:l.:.ir\. (>
socio-economic so alum iiuo the regime. Iligh expectalions arose due to the existing 
populist coalitions and the economic crisis faced due to exteinal dependency, together 
with the thrcitl nf i radic.ili/ed working class to the regime necessitated military coups in 
these countries, fhe result w as the institution of a bureaucratic and an authoritarian state.
According to Sakallioglu whichever paradigm is taken into account, the way military 
interventicins into political life is reevaluated is dependent on whether the problem is 
approahed from the i^ l·.· of militaiy or the civilians "fhus none of the paradigms is 
adequate to mal '· tin clicieni explanation of military intervention.·'^
Another inlluer. iai comlihution to the subject matter of nfilitary interventions has been 
made by l.ric '■-ordhng.ci in his book Soldiers In PoHUcs: M ilitaiy Coups and  
Governmen: N' a ("inge; suggested a typology encompassing three models for the political 
involvement of t!ie military. In the first typology, the military assume the role of 
‘moderators' where the\ exercise veto power' rather than overtly seizing the reins of the 
government Hiiwever. in case the civilian authorities fail to comply with the demands o f 
the militaiy, thee e.secuie a ' dis|.dacement coup’ by bringing a more reliable civilian group 
to power In thi i model, the goals of the military can be outlined; "...to preserve the status 
quo, maintainirg ¡he balance tor imbalance) of power among the contending groups, 
enforcing the p.i'i ical and constitutional ground rules, staving off practically any kind of
Guillermo () Donn.'il. i raH'· Amlinriiarianism: Ar^ j c^niiinL / in (Aoniparative
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important chans·': in the tlislrilnition of economic rcvvaicis, and ensmine, psrlitical order and 
governmental stability ’ '
In Nordlingei’s :;tv;on I model, the military regime is called the 'guardian' regime. Tiie
guardians diflei ¡inm the inoderalois since the) feel it necessai)· to displace the civilian
government, i e il; .■>·■ o\ erll\· assmne control of gos ernment. Their goals include:
... the rein<n d (d st|iiahbling corrujrt. and e.\cessi\'el\· partisan politicians, the 
revamping of the go\eniinental and bureaucratic inachinerv to make for grater 
efficienc)', am: the redistritnnion ol some power and ecmiomic rewards among 
civilian grou:.y·....ITisicall)'. thee intend to coirect what are seen to be the malpractices 
and deiiciei’a'ics ol the |irevious government I he)· aie "iron surgeons” ready to make 
some incision into the bod\· politic, but doing little to replace what has been cut out or 
even to en; ui é' that the surgical operation has lasting consec|uences after praetorians 
discharge the l atient.' "''
Finally., the ihir I t"pe ;'f military regime put forth by Nordlinger is the "ruler” type. In this 
model, theie is no desi.e to maiiiiain the status (.¡uo 'fheir aim is to make basic changes in 
the political, ec nomie and e\en social system " ...'fhey invariably attempt to the root- 
and-branch destructitm of monarchies, traditional oligarchies, and political parties... 
Praetorian rules... commonl)· believe that ..high-powered investment and modernization 
programs are reqifired to bring about steady economic growth...Repression is generally 
more extensive...Polity, econoni)', and society are to be penetrated from above. 
Although both :hc 'm oderators’ and the 'guardians’ tend to be more likely to return to 
their barracks, tiva rulers' opt to stay in place for a more extended period of time.
Eric Nordlinucr. in ¡‘n’tlies Miliinn ( 'ou¡>s nnd (Inx cniiiu'iiis (Englouoocl. N.J: Prentice-Hall,
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How can the ir.iliuiiA· iiilcrxentions in 'l'Lirke\' be calegorized in relation to Norcllinger’s 
tj'pology? Aeci'iding to l iank lachan and Metin llepcr, the I9()0 military coup, in its 
initial phase, could be considered in a position between the ‘guardian’ and the ruler type. 
Only after the \ iotory oi'the moderate senior olTicers led by General Cemal Gürsel over 
the more radical \ oung ollicers, the coup assumed the character of a ‘guardian’ regime. 
The 1971 iiuei\u nbon. on the other hand, conibrms to the ‘moderate’ military mle. The 
militaiy in Iü7l. c'uly threatened to exercise its veto power, keeping the regime intact by 
making onl\ im ' c r.ue changes 1 inall)', the I9<S0 military coup fits neither the ‘ruler’ nor 
to the ‘moderatn:·· r-ategoiies of Nordlinger. Rather it conforms to his ‘guardian’ category 
since the aim of tlva 1980 coup w;is “to remove corrupt and squabbling politicians, revamp 
the machinery ' govei nmeni. and to redistribute some political power and economic 
rewards.’ "'
In order to make a deeper analysis of the relations between the military and the civilians 
one should also focus on the political parties and their attitudes. Explaining the occurrence 
o f military interventions only in terms of the weaknesses detected in the political 
institutions would not be adequate. What should be further taken into consideration is the 
inability of the political actors or the leaders to come to a consensus’. No matter how 
inadequate the political structures are, if the political actors somehow arrive at a 
consensus, they rvould be able to create the conditions to eliminate military interventions. 
The lack of ai ri . lng at a consensus' is an important factor in the explanation of both the
'Tachan and ilcp:;·. "Tlie Si.iic. " 2I-2N
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1960 and I9S0 militar>' interventions in Turke\' since tlie intention of tlie 1980 military 
coup was “to remove the corrupt and squabbling politicians.”
The second chrp-ter of this thesis deals with the e\ents both before and after the 1960 
military intei'vention that re\ eal the close alTinitN' between the RI*P and the military. It also 
includes the |iol:tieaf social, and economic problems that led to the 1971 ultimatum.
The third chaptei mainl> deals w ith the events after the 1971 ultimatum, the change in the 
leadership of the IIPP and its elTeets on both the party itself and the army. Also factors 
contributing to t!r: 1980 militaiy intervention are discussed. In the concluding section, a 
general and a bias'ouiloejk of the relations between the RPP and the military between 
1960 and P '8,1 i:; (Jelineaieek
CHAPTER II: HIE BACKROIINI) OE HIE I960 ΜΙΕΓΙ ARY 
INFER YEN ΓΙΟΝ (1950-1960)
2.1 TFiE BACKGROUND OF THE 1960 MILITARY IN'I'ERVENTION (1950-1960)
The results of the 1950 elections left the Democrats with an astonishing victory since it 
enabled them to terminate 27 year rule of the RPP. For the next ten years, Turkey was 
ruled by the governments of the Democratic PartyfDP) which came to political office with 
an overwhelming majority.
Secularism and the maintenance of political freedoms were the two main issues which led 
to an irreconcilable animosity between the government and the opposition. Also a third 
important issue was the economy. The policies adopted by the Democratic Party about 
each of these issues were going to be the main concerns of the military when intervening 
into politics in May 27, 1960.
Regarding the issue o f secularism, the 1950s can be said to have witnessed the revival of 
Islam in Turkey. The DP’s use of religion for political benefit was going to be one of the 
caicial factors that would lead to the accusation of the government of trying to reverse the 
Kemalist secular policies. In 1949, the RPP had agreed to allow religious instruction for 
students in public schools upon parental request. Adnan Menderes, after coming to power, 
almost reversed the situation and altered this arrangement. The Menderes regime extended 
religious instruction to all schools and required that all Muslim children would receive it
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except the ones wiiose parents specitically refused. Another measure taken by tlie 
Democrats was to increase the number of institutions where imams were trained. In 19.s0, 
they also abolished the law prohibitiny the u.se of Arabic call to prayer. The country 
immediately adopted the Arabic translation of the Quran. Also within this period public 
celebrations began to be made during Ramazan; the number of religious publications 
increased; the remnants of various mystic sects began to re-appear although more 
problematic sects like the Nurcu were severely dealt with between 1950-1960. Another 
step taken by the Democrats which caused them to counter the most concrete criticism by 
the Republicans was the use of the large amount of government funds for building new 
mosques in cities, towns, and villages."  Ozbudun summarizes the period as follows:
...this period witnessed a reawakening of interest in religion; an uncontrolled flow of 
religious (and often reactionary) literature; a vast increase in the number of private 
Koran schools taught mostly by illiterate village hocas; the reappearance of 
reactionary sects and orders...and a partial return to some traditional ways of life 
particularly in matters of the status, dress and public demeanor of women. '·’
Regarding the economic policies of Menderes, the period between 1950-1953 can be said
to be the most successful period of the Democratic Party. One of the promises of
Menderes was rapid economic growth and some amount of improvement can be observed
in this period. The economy was growing rapidly with an increase in bank credits and
improvement in infrastructure. The rate of population growth, gross national product and
per capita income increased. An important contribution of the Menderes government was
opening up the industiy to private enterprise. ''^  This was achieved by the relaxation of the
etatist policies. This general improvement in the economic scene led to the reinforcement
Walter F. Weiker. Hw i'urki\ii Rcvolimon ! 'J60-190!: Aspects of.Military 1‘olitics 
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of the government’s popularity throughout the country. However, economic etatism still 
had many partisans who felt that the importance given by the DP government to private 
enterprise was undermining one of Atatürk’s most important achievements. By 1954, 
these impressive statistics began to turn against the government. Economic growth slowed 
down while both the intlation rate and balance-of-payments deficit began to raise rapidly. 
Rising inflation, increase in exports coupled by an increase in imports were some of the 
negative symptoms of the Menderes government.
The failure o f Menderes’ economic policies brings forth the third problematic area 
between the government and the opposition, that is the maintenance of political freedoms. 
It is mainly this area which caused to the breakdown of the regime in 1960, since the 
growing economic discontent was going to be met with political repression. The 
Democratic Party, which once criticised the Republican People’s Party because of its 
autocratic character, was going to fall to the same trap.
Therefore, economic discontent marks the beginning of the growth o f opposition in the 
second half of the decade. Actually both of the parties were newly introduced an 
opposition, thus did not know how to respond. The Democratic Party was especially 
sensitive to criticisms coming from the opposition party on the issues of its economic and 
religious policies. The universities constituted a major problem for the DP since they 
became heavily politicized due to low salaries given to the junior faculty members and few 
opportunities provided for their promotion. Among the universities, particularly the
William Hale. Turkish Poliiics and the Military (London: Roulledge. 1994). 94,
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faculties of law and political science became centei s of opposition iwlitics. “ ...I’rom 1953 
on, a series of laws was passed wliicli eventually placed severe restrictions on the press, 
the universities and the opposition parties.’"^ ' In .1953, another opiiosition group, the 
Nation Party was banned on the grounds that it was using religion against the Republic. 
Late in 1953, most of the assets of the RPP were confiscated by the government with the 
accusation that they had illegally acquired public funds during the single-party period.
After its victoiy in the elections of 1954, the DP government began to oust civil servants 
without giving them the right to appeal. Also political propaganda was banned from the 
state radio. In the same year, a Press l.aw was enacted with the aim of punishing the 
spreading of false news or insulting the privacy of public officials. Physical violence 
appeared for the first time between the party members in the Assembly.
In 1955, the Secretary General of the RPP, Kasim Gulek, was arrested for insulting the 
government . The same year also saw the suspension of many newspapers including the 
RPP newspaper, f////.v, once again since it was also suspended in 1953. As the universities 
became active centers of opposition politics, the government reacted with suspensions, 
restrictions, and imprisonments.
In 1956, the DP government went further in its repressive policies. A second Press Law 
was passed and newsmen jailed on the grounds of damaging public confidence in or the 
prestige o f the government. Political meetings were prohibited until forty-five days before
VVeiker. The Turkish RevoluUdii. |().
the general election. Any type of electioneering was also prohibited and worst of all the
police was given authority to fire on the crowds in case of unlawful political gatherings.'*3 7
7'he victory of the DP in the elections of 1957 was achieved due to a law passed 
previously by the government. With this law, coalitions were prohibited which worked to 
prevent the opposition from forming a united front. Another election law provision giving 
the party winning the majority vote in a province that province’s entire number of deputies 
was another factor contributing to the DP’s success. Alongside these measures, the 
government introduced restrictions on the Assembly itself Among these restrictions were 
limiting the number and the scope of the questions deputies could ask of ministers, 
tightening regulations for paiiiamentaiy immunity, and forbidding the press from reporting 
on subjects of an oft'ensive nature. '** All these measures put forth by the DP government 
were an indication o f their violation of the basic democratic principles which brought them 
to power. By 1958, the DP lost the sympathy of almost all of the intellectuals and civil 
servants who were the most affected segment of the society due to inflation, shortage, and 
repression.
The first serious violence came in 1959. The RPP leader, ismet İnönü, was hit on the 
head by a rock thrown from crowd during his visit to Usak. The attack came from a pro- 
Democratic mob. He was also attacked by the DP partisans on his return to Istanbul. The 
economic policies of Menderes reached a breaking point as he insisted on continued 
industrialization and rapid capital improvement that fueled inflation. As the country came
·’ Ibid.. 10-11.
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to the edge of national bankruptcy, Menderes felt himself obliged to accept an economic- 
stabilization program set down by the International Monetary Fund. However, this 
program proved to be of no help except that it brought a temporary relief.
As the end of year was reached, a series of events, which led finally to the revolution of 
May 27, occurred. On April 2, the train that took İnönü to Kayseri was stopped by a 
number of soldiers. İnönü was told that the authorities were ordering him to return to 
Ankara. İnönü persisted and continued to Kayseri. On his way back to Ankara, he was 
again blocked in front of a bridge by four army trucks, but was able to make soldiers to 
withdraw. The Kayseri incident was the most direct confrontation between the two 
parties. As Kemal Karpat indicates, Menderes’ fatal mistake was to use the army against 
some demonstrations.
From then on the situation even worsened. On April 18 1959, the DP deputies declared 
their aim to establish a Committee of Investigation to look into the activities o f the 
Republican People’s Party and a section of the press. İnönü responded immediately 
claiming that the proposal was dictatorial, unconstitutional and inviolation of human 
rights. Samet Agaoglu, a Democratic deputy, made an assault on İnönü listing the RPP 
leader’s crimes dating from the War of Independence period. It is at this point that İnönü
Ibid., 11.
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made his famous assertion that ''if you continue on this road, even I will not be able to
save you. .,40
The Investigation Committee, in an obviously well-planned action, was set up after the 
Assembly vote. The Committee’s first act was to issue decrees suspending all political 
activity throughout the country and banning publication of any writing concerning the 
investigation. Weiker indicates that
...the powers granted it on April 27 included forbidding all publications tending to 
impede the investigation; closing newspapers for definite or indefinite periods if they 
violated this prohibition; seizing all documents and property necessary for the 
investigation; forbidding all political activity as the committee deemed necessary; 
imposing summary penalties of from six months to three years imprisonment on 
persons violating any of these prohibitions; any suspending operation of civil service, 
penal, and judicial laws. When İnönü vehemently protested, he was expelled from the 
Assembly for twelve sessions.·”
These measures of the government paved the way for public disquiet and open revolt. 
Violent demonstrations in the cities and universities were taken under control by the help 
of the police and the army. The universities were closed on April 29, 1960; most 
newspapers were suspended; and foreign periodicals reporting on the situation were 
refused entry into the countr>·'.
Again on April 29, Martial Law was declared in Ankara and Istanbul. An open refusal of 
the arbitrary arrest of some officers was the May 21 incident of the protest march of 1000
Metin Tokcr. Demokrasimizin İsmet Pasali YiHari: Demokrasiden Darhew 1957-1960 (.Ankara: Bilgi 
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officers and cadets Irom the Ankara Military C^TlIegc to tire Presidential mansion in 
Çankaya.
Cernai Gürsel, the Commander of the Land Forces, applied for leave. His request was 
initially refused, but then accepted on May 3. His farewell message is an important 
indicator concerning the skepticism of the army for the events going on in the country. In 
his message to all units in the army, Gitr.sel gave an advice so as not to allow the armed 
foi'ces to be used to fur ther the ambitions of politicians. Gitrsel in his letter to Ethern 
Mendeies, the Defence Minister, suggested that both Adrian Menderes and Celai Bayar 
should resign and the Investigation Committee be wound up.·*"
All these developments obliged the actix ists to bring forward their plans for a takeover. 
Gürsel returned from Izmir to the capital and suddenly found himself the leader of a 
revolution.
On May 27, the armed foi'ces br'oadcast a message to the Turkish nation and to the world:
...Owing to the crisis into which our democracy has fallen, and owing to the recent 
sad incidents and in or der to pr'event fratricide, the Turkish Armed Forces have taken 
over the administration of the country. Our aimed forces have taken this initiative for 
the purpose of extricating the parlies from the irreconcilable situation into which they 
have fallen and for the pur pose of handing just and free elections, to be held as soon 
as possible under the supervision and arbitration of an above-party and irnparlial 
administr'ation, and for handing over the administi'ation to whichever parly wins the 
elections.·*·'
'■ Halo. Ti/rkish I'oliiics. |i)7 
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General Gürsel and 38 olTicers representing all branches of the armed forces organized 
themselves into the National Unity C'-ommittee(NUC), to govern the country, assuming 
legal powers under a provisional law that it promulgated soon afterward, though executive 
power remained in the hands of a civilian Council of Ministers, which it appointed or 
controlled.
The regime established by the junta which carried out the 1960 military intervention fits to
the guardian type in Nordlinger’s terms, which is characterized as a regime that took
control of the government for the purpose of preserving or re-establishing the status quo.
The regime established in this period may also be referred to as a “reformist” coup in
Ergun Özbudun’s terms. According to Özbudun,
...as typical of reform coups, the revolutionary otTicers were “highly nationalistic, 
progressive-minded.” Although they did not “instigate a convulsive revolutionär)' 
process”, they did make some reforms in the political, economic, and social structure. 
The accomplishments of the NUC were certainly not confined to “cleaning up the 
government” and “cleaning up the streets.’”*"'
Following the intervention, except for the relatively short period until the ousting of the 
‘radical fourteen’, there was no real militaiy junta installed in power. By the fall o f 1960, 
the government was virtually in the hands of the RPP, although there were militaiy 
personnel in a number of important positions. Before examining the period following the 
fall o f 1960, we should first look at the relationship between the RPP and the military in 
the previous period. This will also include the search for the role of the RPP in the 
preparation of the takeover.
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2.2 REPUBLICAN PEOPLE’S I^AICI'Y AND THE MILITARY BEFORE I960
In the previous cliapter, the informal linkage between tlie RPP and the military has been 
explained in detail when examining the formation of the party in 192d, its relationship with 
Atatiirk’s legacy and reforms and also when determining the importance o f the leader of 
the RPP, İsmet İnönü's personal image in the eyes of the military.
Until the elections of 1954, the RPP maintained its old position as the party that 
represented the entire nation and was still the guardian of Atatiirk’s legacy and reforms. It 
should be remembered that the six basic principles o f Kemalisin (republicanism, 
nationalism, secularism, etatism, populism, and reformism-revolutionarism) had been 
incorporated into the RPP's official ideology. The RPP can be .said to have continued to 
hold the same position after 1954. However, in practice it identified itself increasingly with 
the new generation of intellectuals and their ideology. Beginning to acquire social- 
economic overtones, these intellectuals and their ideology manifested themselves in a more 
radical definition of economic statism leading, some intellectuals to socialism. The relative 
success o f the RPP in the elections of 1957 convinced the RPP leaders that taking a strong 
Kemalist-secularist ideological line with the incorporation of new socio-economic ideas 
would promise future success regarding the reinstatement of their party in power."*^
In contrast, Menderes appeared to reflect the chief interests and fears of the leading social 
groups in small towns and among rural farmers. Although the urban bureaucratic stratum.
Karpal. "Military lniciAeiUioii.s.'' l .uy
whicli had undergone an ideological and cultural transformation, sought modernization 
through imitating the West, the non-urban elites had iuaintained their cultural and religious 
roots and felt a strong sense of continuity with their past.
The DP tried to acquire electoral support among the masses by offering economic 
incentives (credits, subsidies, road building programs, etc.). According to Kemal Karpat, 
the Democrat’s interjection of economic issues into party politics was accompanied by an 
open display of animosity toward the military’s informal linkage with the RPP. So what 
Menderes did in the period was to downgrade the role of the military.
Menderes also began to apply harsh measures to the RPP when he found out that DP’s 
ideology and policies were not acceptable by them. “ ...Menderes had expected the RPP to 
accept the new leadership developing in the ruling coalition in the same way that the 
entrepreneurs, agrarian groups, conservatives, Muslim fundamentalists, etc. had accepted 
the leadership of the secularists, Kemalists, statists, and the military in the past, although 
they had their own v ie w s .M e n d e re s ’ harsh measures against the RPP were explained in 
the previous section. In sum, Menderes tried to quell the opposition and threatened to 
close down the RPP. For Menderes, whatever measures he had adopted was not against 
democracy. On the contrary, this was in fact the meaning o f democracy.
However, if the RPP wei'e the winner of the elections of 1950, they were going to use this 
victory to open tiie path for democi'acy in the country. During the 1950s, what the RPP
Ibid.. 140.
liad in mind was to form the Ck)nstitutional C'ourt, adopt proportional representation in the 
Assembly, abolish all the anti-democratic laws except for the ones prohibiting communism 
and reactionary acts, elevate the government-opposition relations to a contemporary level, 
develop liberties and emphasize to social development. Almost all the principles o f the 
1961 Constitution was accepted and even declared by the RFP during the 1950s. The RPP 
leader ismet İnönü, in his speeches, was pointing to the need of both independent courts 
and judges and was also warning the government against the dangers that might follow 
these kinds of actions. '^  l or the RPP, the 1924 Constitution had to be definitely amended 
to fit democratic procedures. .Again during the 1950s, demands for the formation of a 
Consultative Assembly to make the necessary amendments to the existing Comstitution 
were observed. Howev'er, for İnönü, the Grand National Assembly, but not the 
Consultative Assembly was the right place to make these amendments. Interestingly, the 
DP was not against these amendments but was never able to put it into practice.'*'’
The RPP seized upon the growing public concern with economic and social problems in its 
convention of January 14, 1959, issuing a “Declaration on Primaiy Targets”. These were 
in essence politically liberal and socially egalitarian views such as a bicameral Assembljg a 
new Constitution, independent presidency, independent judges, social justice, and 
proportional representation- similar to the yearnings of the RJ-^ P since the beginning of the
■' Metin Toker. Demokrasiıuiz'u) ismet l’ıısali YiHari: DP'ıı'm Ahin Yillnr l')50-l')54 (Ankara: Bilgi 
Yayinevi. 1991). 9-10. 192.
Cüneyt Arca\ürek. Cüneyt Arcavürek AçikUyor-A: ¡Ur iktidar lUr Ilıtihd /9.5.ı'-/V(SO (.Ankara: Bilgi 
Yavine\i. 19S.S). 26.S.
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decade- which were later incorporated to an excessive extent into the Constitution of 
1961/'''
One of the greatest factors tliat helps explain the RPP-military alliance before and 
immediately after the intervention of I960, is thus the “Declaration on Primary Targets” 
prepared by İnönü, since the following period of the intervention was going to be directed 
by this declaration. In those years, İnönü had great doubts regarding the democratic 
regime. He had also doubts it Menderes and Celal Bayar would let the elections to be held 
or not. He had no doubt, however, was that the Menderes regime would not continue 
under these circumstances. FT-)r İnönü, the only way to save the democratic regime was the 
adoption of the 'primary targets' laid out in his ‘Declaration’.
According to Özbudun, Turkish politics in the 1950s revolved around constitutional 
problems and civil liberties. In fact, the partisan struggle between the two major parties 
were bitter in nature. Interestingly, despite the bitterness of the relations between the 
government and opposition, these two major parties were not drawn apart by distinct 
social and political ideologies, “...on the contrary, their basic views on economic, social, 
and foreign policy were essentially similar, if not identical.” "^
Many students of Turkish politics consider the repressive measures adopted by the 
Democratic Party against the opposition and the unconstitutional laws which restricted the
Ibid., 264. See also Kemal Kaipai. "Turkish t)einocracy at Impasse: Ideology. Party Politics and the 
Third Mililar)' Inlcncnlioii.” InUTiiaiinnul Joiimal of Turkish Snidics 2( 1981). 12-13.
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civil liberties as the main source that iiinamed the military and intellectuals of the period. 
In fact, the formation of the Committee to Investigate the Activities of the Republican 
People’s Party and a Section of the press is the greatest example o f the constitutional 
crisis encountered before 1960. A good deal of evidence suggest that the hostility of the 
militaiy against the Menderes regime increased by these incidents. For example, on May 3, 
1960, General Gürsel sent a letter to the government protesting police brutalities against 
students. In the same letter, General Gürsel pointed to the need to abolish anti-democratic 
laws, the abolition of the investigation CA'»mmittee, the release of journalists and students 
arrested in connection with recent incidents and the resignation of President 
Bayar.^'However, in the eyes of the military, the ideals of the preservation of Atatiirk’s 
principles and the prevention of authoritarianism was totally ignored by the Democratic 
Party.
The coup of 1960 was instigated by a group of middle-ranking otTicers whose opposition 
to the Democratic regime can be traced back to the changes that occurred during the 
1950s.
In terms of its organization and equipment, there was not a considerable change compared 
to the army’s position of the 1920s. Most o f the army’s weapons dated from the First 
World War. Above all, Fevzi Çakmak’s long term as the Chief of General Staff had stifled 
innovation and initiative. Promotion depended on seniority rather than ability. “This 
stultification in the army coincided with rapid change in the civilian arms of the state.” '·
Ibid.. 1.3.
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It was due to these conditions tliat United States began to pour new equipment- artillery, 
trucks, tanks, and fighter aircraft - in order to help 'furkey to fulfill its commitments to the 
Western alliance, 'fhe American military authorities also prompted a massive reform of the 
militaiy education system. New schools were established for a better training. A new 
personnel section was set up in the General Staff for the purpose of making promotions 
dependent on training and proven ability rather than seniority. However, for many middle­
ranking and junior olficers, these reforms were not enough. For them, a purge was needed 
in the upper ranks to eliminate those generals who were too committed to old and 
authoritarian ways. Initially, both Bayar and Menderes welcomed these proposals put forth 
by Seyfi Kurtbek who was the Minister of Defense in 1952. But soon afterwards, rumors 
began to be circulated that Kurtbek would purge the army and then use the Defense 
Ministry to capture total power. Accordingly, the reform program was dropped and 
Kurtbek was forced to resign in July 1953.^'
Not surprisingly, elimination of the reform program intensified political activism among 
junior officers who supported the idea of clearing the top of the army and who also aimed 
ultimately to overthrow the government. As mentioned above, these younger officers were 
to a great extent differentiated and radicalized by the reforms in the military training 
system. Due to contact with their colleagues in Western countries, they noticed that the
Ibid.. 96-97.
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foreign commanders gave mucli more scope for individual initiative by middle-ranking 
officers than had ever been allowed in Turkey.^'
Some army officers had close connections witli and were loyal to the Republican People’s
Party from the beginning and thus were unsympathetic to the Democrats. Many others
were disillusioned by the election results of 1950, but were not able to interfere since
Inonii prevented such an attempt. It was clear that
...because the army’s connections with the single-party regime had been strong, there 
was a growing fear that the army, like the civil service, now counted for far less in a 
country where power had been assumed by businessmen, independent professionals 
and better-off peasants. Under the new regime, the individual citizen, rather than the 
state (primarily represented by the army and civil bureaucracy) was encouraged to act 
on the main moti\ e force of national development.’'
Inevitably, this led the army officers to feel themselves robbed of the central role which
they had traditionally enjoyed in Turkish political culture. For many officers, Menderes
was deliberately trying to downgrade the traditional role of the army.
In more material terms, the officers salaries in the 1950s were not able to keep up with the 
high inflation rate due to the government’s haphazard economic policies. The 
government’s disregard of the material welfare of the armed forces was a serious error. 
What junior officers saw was the gap between the rich and the poor and these officers 
were on the declining side of it. ’'’
Ibid.. 97-98.
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The stimulus for the I960 military intervention was rather the malfunctioning of party 
politics since for some students of Turkish politics, DP’s relations with the military did not 
appear to be so antagonistic so as to engender support for a take-over. There were indeed 
a variety of small associations within the army since 1954, but these were revolutionary 
societies.
A question relates to the fact whether Menderes expected a coup, and if he did, why did 
he fail to prevent it. It seems that he was aware of anxiety within the army. However, his 
fatal mistake was that he had taken the promise of the Chief of the General Staff, General 
Riisdii Erdelhun, that the army would remain loyal to the government.
Another question relates to the fact whether the RPP had any relationship with the army in 
the preparation o f the coup. It is true that the supporters of the DP believed that there was 
a conspiracy involving of ismet İnönü to destroy the DP. However, biographies of İnönü 
show that he did not know anything prior to coup. According to Metin Toker, İnönü only 
knew that the illegal practices of Menderes would not be accepted by the army. The army 
knew that they would not find İnönü on their way if they intervened. Actually immediately 
after the intervention, the leader of the coup was going to telephone İnönü and ask him if 
he had any orders.”
’ Toker. Demokrasimizin Ismei Fasali Yillari: Demokrasiden Darbeye, 206.
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2.3 THE NATIONAL UNITY COMMITTEE PERIOD (J960-1961)
3’he formation of the NUC was mentioned in tlie previous section. It remained in power 
for little more than a year. In this period, major policy changes were made in the economic 
sphere. The first step was to curb the inflation. The NUC stopped most of the large 
infrastructure projects. Banks were temporarily closed, and personal accounts of the 
leading politicians and businessmen were frozen. Price controls were introduced, food 
prices were dropped. Land taxes were increased tenfold, income tax was doubled."5S
Although economic reforms were successful, the NUC concentrated more on technical 
issues like the trials of the Democrats, the writing of a new constitution and an election 
law. There was less importance on such goals as improving education, industrial and 
agricultural modernization and expansion, and land reform.
By the fall o f 1960, several factions were formed within the NUC. The moderate group 
believed that power should be returned to the civilians as soon as possible, so that social 
reforms were put into action. Some members of this group were believed to be in contact 
with the RPP. There was also a radical group who had authoritarian and ultra-nationalistic 
views. The tension between these two groups constituting the main theme of the events 
will be discussed in the following section. The same events will also reveal the close 
connections the military had with the RPP, that the military on some occasions, 
cooperated with the party o f the “hero” of the Independence War. The militai"y rule of
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1960, unlike the intervention of 1980, reflected a good deal of cooperation of the military 
and the RPP.
2.3.1. PURGE OF THE FOURTEEN RADICALS
After the takeover, the top leadership in the Republican People’s Party, headed by İnönü 
and his associates, tried to extricate the military from politics. However, it was soon 
evident that the division between conservatives and radicals that emerged in the 1950s was 
still veiy much alive. For the symbolic leader of the coup. General Gürsel, the main 
purpose was to limit the army’s political role to a minimum and to hand over power to an 
elected government as quickly as possible.
Apart from the senior officers and İnönü, many of the junior officers had the far more 
ambitious aims such as seizing power to initiate radical social, economic, and political 
reforms. This necessitated o f course a fairly prolonged period of military rule. A conflict 
regarding both the aims and methods was thus built into the regime from the start.
The radicals’ military training had not prepared them to think of politics in an objective 
manner. When they were in military schools, political reading was totally excluded from 
the curricula, a factor that left them with some degree of political naivete. Toker indicates 
that their favorite reading was “Polly Ajina” and “In the Countiy of the White Lillies”, the
Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel K. Shaw. History o f the Ottoman Empire ami Modern Turkey (London. New 
York, Melbourne: Cambridge University Press. 1977). 41.^ .
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latter presenting a romantic picture of the army. According to Toker, tliey were all Polly 
Annas, and looked at all difficulties through the eyes of an optimistic little girl.
The fourteen radical members o f the NUC were ousted in November \3, I960, and were 
sent out the country, mostly as militaiy attaches to Turkish embassies around the world. 
The purge of these radicals was not entirely unexpected since it was widely accepted that 
Colonel Alparslan Tiirkes and others were responsible for one of the “NUC’s worst 
political blunders”, the firing of the 147 professors in October. The 147 were accused of 
preventing reforms, putting their own interests above those o f the nation, using their titles 
for private advantage, lacking academic qualifications and blocking the advancement of 
younger teachers, and holding political views against the best interest of the na t i o n . Th e  
147 incident had brought about the first serious criticisms of the NUC by civilian political 
groups.
Radicals like Özdag were claiming that they were forced to go further than Atatürk and 
complete what he left uncompleted, thus they had to establish a revolutionary regime. As 
an elaboration o f this idea, Tiirkes proposed that the military should stay in power for four 
years. Having in mind the possibility that the other members of the NUC might oppose this 
proposal, the radicals themselves planned a purge of the Committee. Therefore it seems 
that the 13 November expulsions were designed to eliminate a counter-purge.'”*
Weiker, The Turkish Revolution. 53. 
Hale, Turkish Politics, 132.
Some of the Fourteen’s concerns were basically democratic, but what they were worried 
about was the “İnönü factor”. It was widely assumed that if the general elections were 
held in near future, the RPP most probably would be the winner, since none of its rivals 
had time to be well prepared. This result, for these radicals, would make the army to be 
seen as overthrowing Menderes to install İnönü, which would cause the loss of a non­
partisan image. They wished to clear the suspicions of many Turks that there was a secret 
alliance between the army and the RPP. For some time they tried to establish their own 
party, however, after the failure of these approaches, they were left with the idea of 
postponing the elections with he aim of avoiding the hand-over of the power to the RPP.'’'
The relations with the NUC and the RPP was also important for Gürsel. Initially he 
planned to retire as soon as the civilian government was restored, but later on he was 
attracted to the idea of becoming the president of the republic in a post-military regime. 
With this aim Gürsel asked İnönü o f his party’s support for his candidacy. İnönü only 
assured Gürsel that he would not put his own name forward as a candidate for the 
presidency. Gürsel, being left assured of a relatively free am was able to take the step of 
ousting the radicals from the Committee who opposed an early return to elected civilian
government. 62
Another important issue contributing to the purge of fourteen radicals was the 
establishment o f the Constituent Assembly, the basic question of whether there would be
Ibid.. 133.
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an early return to civilian politics after the elections or not. Fourteen of the NUC 
members, including both Gürsel and Cemal Madanoglu, supported the idea of establishing 
the Assembly whereas sixteen, including the fourteen radicals, opposed it with othei’ seven 
remaining neutral. Gürsel needed four-fifths majority o f the NUC in order to prevent the 
proposal from being blocked. Thus he had no alternative except purging the radicals from 
the Committee.*'’
With the purge of the fourteen radicals, the NUC: was no more a Committee that 
contained any opponents to the RPP. Thus, İnönü, by the purge of these radicals, was 
getting closer to achieve his ideal of passing to a civilian government as early as possible. 
Another contribution of the purge was related with the RPP itself since it weakened the 
power o f the ideologically oriented young radicals within the party.
2.3.2. THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY AND THE NEW CONSTITUTION
The writing o f a new constitution was one of the central aims of the military. What the 
Committee of university professors, that was set up by the National Unity Committee, 
believed to be necessary was “...the preparation o f a constitution that will ensure the 
materialization o f a state law, set up state organs, and ensure that state social institutions 
are placed on a democratic basis and on principles of right and justice, to replace the 
[existing] Constitution of the state which has been neglected and rendered inoperative.”*''
Hale, '¡'urkish Politics. Ltii.
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On January 6, 1961, the NIJC charged the Constituent Assembly for preparing tlie new 
constitution. The Assembly was composed of two cliambers, the National Unity 
Committee and the House of Representatives. The latter consisted of members either 
elected by the people through indirect elections, or by ones chosen by the Head of the 
State, the NUC, the existing political parties (the Republican People’s Party and the 
Republican Peasant Nation Party), the bar associations, labor unions, the judiciary, 
universities, farmers’ associations, the press, chambers of commerce and industry. With 
this social composition, the establishment of the Constituent Assembly marked an 
important shift o f power back to civilian hands. However, although only a minority of the 
members were chosen by the military, the exclusion of the DP and the monopoly of the 
RPP sympathizers were considered to be the weakness. Actually this monopoly 
strengthened the general expectation that a return to civilian rule meant a return to the
RPP government. 65
The main debate in the Assembly was between the liberals who represented the propertied 
class and social-reform-oriented groups who represented the intellectual elitists. The new 
constitution was a compromise between these two groups with an effort to prevent the 
reemergence o f an authoritarian partisan regime based on oppressive parliamentary 
majorities. On May 27, 1961 the Constitutional Committee’s draft was accepted by the 
Constituent Assembly with only minor revisions and was enacted after being ratified by a 
popular vote on July 9, 1961
''■'Hale. Turkish Politics. 1.16-137. 
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According to Ôzbiiduii, there were few conflicts between the NUC and tlie Constituent 
Assembly, where the Republican People’s Party constituted the majority. One of these 
conflicts was the rate of land and building taxes. Another factor causing friction was a 
conflict centered on a similar problem, i.e. the constitutional provision on land reform. 
Article 38 o f the Constitution stated that
.. the state and other corporate bodies, where public interest deems it necessary, are 
authorized... to expropriate the whole or a part of any immovable property under 
private ownership, or to impose an administrative servitude tiiereon provided that the 
true equivalent value is immediately paid in cash. The form of payment of tlie true 
equivalent values of land expropriated for the purpose of enabling farmers to own 
land, for nationalization of forests, for afforestation, and for accomplishing the 
establishment of settlement projects shall be provided by law. Where the law deems it 
necessary that payment be made by installments, the period of payment shall not 
exceed ten years.The provision concerning the ten-year peiiod o f payment in 
installments led to a conflict in the House of Representatives of the Constituent 
Assembly, severely criticized by the right-wing of the People’s Party. The House 
insisted to cut the period to five years, however, was not successful, thus the original 
provision was retained.
Another conflicting issue between the NUC and the Constituent Assembly was the 
inauguration o f the Declaration o f Wealth by the NUC. This measure was presented with 
the aim o f preventing tax evasion. As in the case of other social reforms attempted by the 
Committee, immediate reaction came from the parties and the business groups, “...[the] 
İnönü government returned the declarations to be filled out a new; but the business groups 
apparently not satisfied with this move, continued to lobby for the outright repeal of the
Declaration o f Wealth „ 6 8
” Ozbuduii. The Role o f the Mililary, 24-23,
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The NÜC was able to remove llfly-five ‘agas’ to compulsory residence in Western Turkey 
and to confiscate their lands with the purpose of breaking the semi-feudal system in 
Eastern Turkey. However, what the RPP-JP coalition government did as soon as the 
coalition was formed was to allow the ‘agas’ to return to their i)ievious places and to give 
them back all their land and property that had not yet been distributed, 'fhis act brings us 
to the dilemma o f the NUC that led them to be in contradiction between two basic goals: 
to carry out the social reforms and to return power to a civilian government as early as 
possible. It seems that the NUC was committed more to its second aim. '^f)9
It can be easily admitted that the militaiy officers in general felt more sympathy with the 
RPP. This sympathy can be said to have both social and political roots. Their sociological 
sympathy for the RPP can be explained by the deteriorating socio-economic position of 
the officer corps and that of the civil bureaucracy that retained close affinity with the RPP. 
The historical link between the party and Atatürk and his successor İsmet Pasha as a party 
leader should also be taken into consideration. Not surprisingly, the final form of the 
Constitution also reveals to a great extent the affinity and cooperation o f the RPP and 
NUC, and it also reinforces the claim that the government was in the hands of the RPP.
As it has been mentioned earlier, the RPP in Januaiy 14, 1959, issued a “Declaration on 
Primary Targets” where they voiced their yearnings for politically liberal and socially 
egalitarian views such as a new constitution, bicameral Assembly, independent presidency, 
independent judges, social justice, proportional representation, constitutional court, the
69 Ibid.
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Republic. The introduction of the second chamber limited the possibility of forminu a 
dictatorship by the majority party since the single chamber had been exploited to a great 
extent by Menderes. The lower house consisted of 450 members who were directly 
elected. The Senate, on the other hand, consisted of 188 members, of whom 150 were to 
be elected and fifteen appointed by the President. Differences between the chambers in the 
new bicameral legislature in terms of method of election and duration in term of office 
stemmed from the hope of avoiding the domination of the same party in both chambers.^"
One of the basic concerns of the makers of the 1961 Constitution was the prevention of 
monopoly over political power. This was going to be guaranteed by the supremacy of the 
Constitution, the separation o f powers and the limitation of political power on certain 
institutions by making them independent, autonomous, and non-political. Thus under the 
1961 Constitution, universities and the Turkish Radio and Television (TRT) were given 
autonomous status.
In contrast to the 1924 Constitution, the 1961 Constitution provided the Turkish citizens 
with a wide variety o f civil rights and liberties. According to Bülent Tanör, four important 
principles were accepted concerning civil rights and liberties. First, whatever limitations to 
be imposed on rights and liberties should be enacted on a constitutional basis. Second, any 
limitation imposed should not contradict the letter and the spirit of the constitution. Third,
'-Ibid., 77.
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the source of any limitation imposed should be the laws but not administrative action. 
Fourth, the law should not infringe upon the essence of any right or liberty.^'
The makers of the 1961 Constitution urged for a planned economy, thus they established 
the State Planning Organization which was entitled to develop plans for economic, social, 
and cultural development. According to Weiker, the incorporation of the Planning 
Organization into the Constitution was partly due to strong predilection that came from 
the Republican People’s Party that led to its adoption in specific and non-political form. ·^*
After its acceptance by a popular vote on July 9, the 1961 Constitution came under attack 
on the grounds that it was not the product o f a social consensus since the Constituent 
Assembly was dominated by RPP sympathizers. Celai Bayar also criticized the 
Constitution as being nothing more than the constitutional legitimization of the 
bureaucracy and the intellectuals.’  ^ Similarly, according to Ciineyt Arcayiirek, the 
Constituent Assembly of 1960 could be regarded as the “single party Assembly.”’'^
By the introduction of new electoral laws providing for a system of proportional 
representation, a new era of coalitions appeared on the Turkish political scene after the 
elections of October 15, 1961. The first Grand National Assembly of Turkey’s Second 
Republic convened in Ankara on October 25, 1961. After the election of General Giirsel
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as the President of the Republic on October 27, the first coalition of the Republic was 
formed between the RPP and the Justice Party (JP),
The following will examine how the relationship between the military and the RPP evolved 
until to the 1971 ultimatum. The major question here is whether the period may be 
accepted as the continuation of the old alliance between the military and the RPP or was it 
the beginning of the end for this coalition?
It should be remembered that the NOG always insisted that it was impartial, and in many 
ways, it seriously worked to demonstrate this. However, as the NUC became more pro- 
Republican in content and as it severely needed the advice of the experienced RPP 
members, the Committee began to be identified more and more with it. In some cases, 
events themselves worked to identify the activities of the NUC with the RPP. The 
Yassiada trials, for instance, often focused on the actions of the Menderes regime that 
were directed against the RPP. In other instances, however, the RPP itself was mainly 
responsible for the close identification. The best example of the latter is the Constituent 
Assembly created by the NUC in January 1961 dominated by the RPP.
The results of the election in 1961 gave the Justice Party 168, the New Turkey Party 29, 
and the Republican People’s Party 187 out of total 450 seats in the Assembly. “...Thus the 
Republican party favored by the military was in the minority, while the groups thought to
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be loyal or sympathetic to the ousted Democrats and antagonistic to the Revolution had a 
majority in both houses.’’
After the ousting o f the fourteen radicals, there were still serious rumblings of discontent 
in the armed forces. Within the army and air force a body was formed known as the 
Armed Forces Union (AFU), which at times threatened to act as a counter-junta to the 
NUC. Not many people knew the exact membership or even the existence of this Union. 
However, it is clear that the Unions existence reflected the danger o f a split within the 
armed forces.
The results of the October 15 elections provoked the hawks of the AFU. Consequently, on 
October 21, 1961, a group of officers belonging to the Union and adviced by some 
university professors reached agreement to intervene on behalf of the armed forces before 
the legislature met, in order to turn over the “revolution to the nation’s true and 
competent representatives,” to ban political parties, to dismiss the NUC, and to nullify the 
“elections”.”^According to Talat Aydemir and his friends, the results had ‘not completely 
realized the national will’ so they came to the decision to intervene. AFU was divided over 
the issue o f either preparing an immediate coup or waiting until the new government had 
demonstrated its ineffectiveness. As the first group won the argument, on 21 October, a 
protocol was signed among seven generals, four admirals, and twenty-seven colonels in
' Ibid.. 220-221.
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Istanbul,^'^ 7’he “21 October i^rotocol” declared that they were going to intervene into tlie 
situation before the Grand National Assembly convened. Against this protocol Cevdet 
Sunay, the Chief of the General Staff at the time, called an extra-ordinary meeting on 
October 23 with his four f'orce Commanders and a number of other senior ofllcers. This 
meeting put forth a series of compromise proposals that were put to the leaders of the 
parties at a second meeting held in the presidential mansion at Çankaya on 24 October.
The Generals, pointing to the threat of the implementation of the 21 October Protocol, 
convinced Ragip Gumuspala (leader of the Justice Party), İnönü and leaders of the other 
parties to accept that İnönü would become prime minister, and that the parties would 
support Gürsel’s election as president. I'here would be no amnesty for those ex- 
Democrats who had been convicted but not executed, ‘for the time being' (which was 
insisted by İnönü). Also, the 5000 officers and the 147 professors ousted would not be 
reinstated to their former positions,^"
The results of the elections also caused an uproar in the RPP. Eveiybody accused one 
another. Thus, İnönü decided to make a press conference declaring that the results were of 
no danger for the RPP, and that they would welcome to be the opposition party, or if the 
national interest deemed it necessary, they would form coalitions. The election results did 
not let them to govern the country as they wished, but the same results would not let the 
others to do so either, Inönü’s speech eased the discomfort within the party. Following the 
press conference, the party council convened and came to the conclusion that the parties
Arcaviirek. Cüneyt Arcayiirek A<, ikliyor-4. 139.
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who considered themselves as winners did not know what they would do eitlicr. Thus, 
they decided to accept İnönü’s comments on the situation and to wail.'^'
İnönü immediately heard about the rumors about the decision oF the AFU and sent a 
message to the Refik Tulga, Chief of the General Staff. He was not only against the 
alleged counter-coup but he also considered the opening of the Assembly an honor that 
the NUC should carry out. If the army did not accept to hand over power to a party whom 
they did not want, the RFP would take other measures, otherwise the army would not find 
İnönü on its side as it did on May 27, 1960. İnönü’s basic aim was to see the Assembly 
opened; thus the 24 October protocol was accepted under these circumstances.^'
2.4 THE BACKGROUND OF THE 1971 ULTIMATUM
The coalition government formed by İsmet İnönü in November 1961 was beset with 
problems beginning from the day it was formed. The idea of a coalition was unfamiliar in 
Turkey because all governments since 1923 had been based on single parties. The leaders 
of the Republican People’s Party did not expect to find themselves within a coalition 
before the election of 1961, let alone in one formed with the Justice Party.
“...The return to a civil government brought to the fore once more the conflicts 
created by the Revolution. The Justice Party, and to a lesser extent the New Turkey 
Party, supported basically by the members of the defunct Democratic Party, soon 
began indirectly to denounce the Revolution, to demand amnesty for the Democratic 
Party leaders, and deviously to attack the Senators who were ex-members of the 
NUC. It seemed that the social and political groups that had dominated Turkish
Ibid.. 303-305.
Ibid., 306-308.
politics prior to 1960 Iiad regained the upper hand in tlie legislature, and gradually 
they began to undo what the military had tried to achieve, during their brief stay in
power.
By early December 1961, the Justice Parly and the New Turkey Parly deputies began to 
discuss the possibility of an amnesty bill. Since the army chiefs stood firm against the 
campaign for an amnesty, a reply came from the former Air Force colonel, Mucip Atakli. 
He was warning the party leaders that granting an amnesty would lead to a more terrifying 
intervention by the armed forces.
The most serious problem of tlie senior commanders in this period, was to settle down the 
concerns of the middle ranking officers who believed that they had not achieved their aims 
in the 21 October Protocol of 1961. Some of the top commanders were critical about 
İnönü, giving their support to the radicals secretly. However, the majority appeared to 
agree with General Cevdet Sunay that another coup would be hardly justified since too 
little time had passed after the reinstatement of the civilian regime. On 19 January 1962, 
Sunay held a meeting and declared that ‘‘...the Armed Forces Union must be disbanded 
and the soldiers must go back to their barracks.”**·* The reaction to the threatened 
dissolution of the radical group materialized in the abortive coups attempted by Colonel 
Talat Aydemir twice in Februaiy 22, 1962 and May 20, 1963.
The first step taken by the radicals was the meeting o f fifty-nine officers of the rank of 
colonel and above in Balmumcu barracks in Istanbul on 9 February to prepare another
Karpal. "The Militaiy and Politics in Turke\ ," 1979. 
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‘protocol’, where they declared that they would take action but not violate the normal 
chain o f command. They would establish a 25-man ‘Security Council’ vested with 
legislative powers. They would form a cabinet and set up a National Assembly consisting 
of the former members of the NUC and the fourteen radicals expelled in November 1960. 
The National Assembly was going to cai'17 out the reforms which the 27 May revolution 
failed to achieve.
At a meeting held on 18 February attended by the four force commanders, Sunay openly 
opposed the idea of a counter-coup. Next he called in Aydemir and after listening to his 
arguments, indicated that this kind of an action could be implemented in case İnönü 
resigned or died.’’^  Thus the original plan was suspended.
2.4.1. THE 22 FEBRUARY PUTSCH
Talat Aydemir decided to put his forces on alert when he learned that some of his 
supporters were going to be taken under custody at the General Staff Headquarters. The 
General Staff interned the officers who were appointed to the command of supportive 
forces who were arrested when they reflised orders.
In Çankaya, President Gürsel together with General Sunay, İnönü and the other members 
of the government were in urgent conclave. Major Fethi Gürcan, a supporter of Aydemir, 
was able to gain control of Ç a n k a y a .As he was about to take over the government he
Talat Aydemir, Talat Aydernir'in Hatiralari (İstanbul: Kitapcilik Ticaret. 1968). 129.
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supplied İnönü and Sunay with ample time to call support from othermilitary units. He was 
either going to surrender or start a civil war.
On the same evening Aydemir and his supporters contacted Ekrem Alican, the leader of 
the New Turkey Party and put forth their demands for new elections under a new electoral 
law, a progressive administration that would achieve the objectives of 27 May, the release 
of his arrested friends, and the concellation of the appointments.
İnönü, determined not to accept Aydemir’s demands, sent a message to him, stating that if 
he and his colleagues dropped their action immediately, then no legal action would be 
taken against them. This was backed by a similar message from Sunay. Talat Aydemir and 
Dündar Seyhan then surrendered themselves at the General Staff building.*’’
The failure of the 22 February putsch showed that the top commanders opposed the idea 
o f a second coup and that a considerable part of the army were on their side. In fact, the 
factor that secured the loyalty of the majority of the officers was the existence of the 
honored old soldier, İnönü, as head of government. At the moment of crisis, İnönü did 
not panic, thus, did not give any significant concessions to the rebels.
In his public announcement on 26 Febaiary, İnönü claimed that Aydemir carried out his 
action with the purpose of taking over the governm ent.H ow ever, İnönü had to keep his 
promise. In fact, the promise was the speediest way of ending the rebellion and of avoiding
 ^ Ibid., 81-89. And Aydemir. Talar Avdemir'in liatiralari, 138-142.
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the risk of bloodshed. Mis personal reputation both within the army and outside could not 
allow İnönü to go back on his promise. He also did not assume that Aydemir would be 
foolish enough to make a second attempt if he was left free.
The 22 February revolt caused serious repercussions in the armed forces. Sixty-nine 
officers who were suspected of collaboration were dismissed, which led to the 
disappearance o f the support of the radicals for Aydemir.
At the end ofFebruaiy, all the party leaders, under İnönü’s chairmanship, signed a joint 
declaration where they agreed to prevent any kind of action against the legitimacy of the 
27 May revolution. On 8 March, the parliament passed a new law which made the attack 
to the legitimacy of the 27 May coup, or the claim that any party was a continuation of the 
Democratic Party, a heavily punishable offense.
The following period was one when the army increased its authority over the politicians 
through passing a legislation, extending the powers of the National Security 
Council(NSC). The NSC, established by the 1961 Constitution, was to assist the Council 
of Ministers regarding the decisions concerned with national security and coordination. By 
the passage of the new law, the council was going to provide preparatory and advisoiy 
assistance to the government, to secure coordination between organizations working in 
the fields of internal and external security,' '^*
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The treatment of the 22 FebiLiary rebels was to determine the fate of the followiii” 
coalitions that would be formed by İnönü. İnönü had promised that the rebels would not 
be tried, but the pro-Democrats on the other hand were reluctant to accept this unless an 
amnesty was also granted to the convicted members of the Menderes regime. On 23 April, 
Sunay warned the pro-Democrats that it was an ugly trick to mix the military amnesty 
with the other.
Although İnönü agreed to reduce the sentences passed at Yassiada, this concession was 
not enough for the pro-Democrat deputies. Thus, to form a more cooperative coalition, 
İnönü submitted the resignation o f his cabinet on May 1962. On 24 June, he announced 
his second coalition which brought together, besides his party, the New Turkey Party, the 
Republican Peasant’s Nation Party and a group of independents. İnönü hoped that the 
exclusion of the Justice Party would prove more cooperative. However, contrai'y to this 
hopes, political stability was also threatened by continued demands for amnesty by the 
pro-Democrat opposition.
After Aydemir’s putsch, a crisis appeared in the RPP, when İnönü accused some members 
in his party o f cooperating with the conspirators in the army. This accusation was directed 
against Turgut Göle, Kasim Gülek, and Avni Dogan which finally led to their removal 
from the party for sometime. On the side of the army, on the other hand, the Air Force
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Commander, İrfan Tansel declared that eleven officers were to be purged from the army 
on the grounds that they were in contact with Aydemir.'^'
İnönü in his speech in the Assembly declared that these eleven officers played an important 
role against the conspirators of 22 February putsch and in the reinstatement of the civilian 
regime. According to İnönü, there was no one in the army against the civilian regime and 
the army was strong enough to eliminate these ideas. Five months, after İnönü’s speech, in 
May 1963, Aydemir attempted his second putsch.
2.4.2. AYDEMIR’S FINAL PUTSCH
Aydemir’s imprisonment, due to a personal attack on İnönü, did not put an end to his 
conspiratorial activities. He maintained his links with the Military College cadets. In 
interviews with foreign journalists, he openly talked about his plans for another coup, 
including his lists for those who were to be made ministers in his government.
Among the various conspiratorial groups formed during 1962-1963, Aydemir formed one 
called the “cocktail group” with his old comrades where they decided to organize their 
coup as soon as possible so that they would eliminate other attempts.
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Meanwhile, in the Assembly, political temperature was rising. On 28 March, Celal Bayar’s 
conditional release from prison in Kayseri led to a demonstration against the government 
by his supporters. At the same time, the pro-Democrat section of the Justice Party began 
to demand an amnesty. On 14 May, İnönü made a statement that the situation wascritical, 
and that anything may happen. All members of the Assembly were asked to remain in 
Ankara and İnönü made some important consultations with Gürsel and Sunay.'^'
Aydemir’s second attempted coup was launched on the night o f 20-21 May 1963. His only 
notable collaborator was Major Fethi Gürcan. On 20 May he seized the radio studios in 
Ankara, from where they declared that the Grand National Assembly was dissolved and 
that all political activity was banned. Later on. Aydemir took command of the Military' 
College. However, the cadets and the young officers who joined them failed to establish 
control over key points in the city. Following his radio declaration, Lieutenant-Colonel Ali 
Elverdi, who came to the radio station, broadcast telling the listeners to ignore Aydemir’s 
earlier proclamation, assuring them that the government was still in control. This followed 
another proclamation by Aydemir declaring martial law and a c u rfe w .T h e  lines between 
the radio studios in town and the broadcasting transmitter at Etimesgut were cut and 
Sunay made another announcement confirming that the armed forces were still under 
government’s orders and Aydemir’s men would be punished. The rebels were then warned 
that they will be attacked from the air if they did not surrender immediately. Aydemir and 
his supporters left the Military College by a back entrance from where they went back to 
their homes.
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Aydemir and all the ofllcers who had joined him were arrested together with 1459 Military 
College cadets. During the trial, seven of the accused were sentenced to death. The cadets 
were all dismissed from the Military College as a warning to their successors.
2.4.3. THE CIVILIAN-MILITARY RECONCIL1A1ION, I963-1968
Aydemir’s final putsch, and his and Gürcan’s executions showed to the potential coup- 
makers that if they attempted to act similarly they would meet the same fate. From 1963 
on, the danger seemed to have passed and a reconciliation was established between the 
civilian government and the armed forces. Several among the Fourteen, who had opposed 
GiirseFs attempt for a return to an elected regime in 1960, now began to appear on the 
political scene. Alparslan Türkes was the chief example, who took over the leadership of 
the almost defunct Republican Peasant’s Nation Party in July 1965.
All these changes brought about against a background of continuous governmental 
instability, made İnönü confront problems concerning his second coalition ( the New 
Turkey Party and the Republican Peasants Nation Party) as well. In 1963, the small parties 
decided to walk out of the coalition due to the government’s poor performance in local 
elections. On December 25, İnönü announced a new cabinet formed by the members of 
the Republican People’s Party and some independents. “...The military stood by as the 
silent guardian o f the Constitution and the faithful supporter of the RPP, which was still
Avdeiuir, 'falat Avileinir’in flaiiralari, 246-255.
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legarded as the sole party tliat understood and could implement the (^■¡nstitution of 1961 
and maintain the principles of Kemalism.”'^ '’
A crisis seemed to be threatening the regime in June 1964 with the death of Ragip 
Gümüspala , the Justice Party’s first chairman. The senior army commanders were worried 
that his successor would be a pro-Democrat . As a warning Cevdet Sunay, who was 
annoyed by the attacks on the army at provincial party congresses, (chiefly those o f the 
JP) indicated that these attacks were dividing the countiy and were abusing the 
Constitution just as Menderes had done. He implied that if the opposition parties did not 
mend their ways then a second coup would come.^’
The Justice Party’s national congress assembled in Ankara on 27 November 1964 in two 
weeks time of Sunay’s warning. The two candidates for party leadership were Saadettin 
Bilgiç and Süleyman Demirel. Demirel’s neutral position of not being overtly identified 
with the former Democratic Party contributed to his being favored by the army 
commanders.
Demirel’s election as the Justice Party chairman had the effect of lowering political 
tension, which was evident during 1964-1965. Inönü’s third coalition lost office in 
February 1965, when its budget proposals were defeated in the House of Representatives. 
The premiership was entiaisted to a respected independent Senator, Suat Hayri Ürgüplü
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who formed a four-party co a litio n .D em ire l who became deputy prime minister, 
enhanced his potential stance and was able to prove his credibility within public as well as 
in the army.
The advancing popularity of the Justice Party led to its victory in the general elections of 
1965, and Demirers first one-party cabinet was announced on 27 October 1965. While the 
Justice Party succeeded in winning 240 of the 450 seats, the RPP was reduced to 134 
seats.
The RPP’s defeat in the elections o f 1965, revealed the split in the party which may be 
traced back to 1961. After 1961, the social-democratic(statist-socialist) groups in the RPP 
had acquired considerable influence. ‘'...The radicals within the RPP blamed the party’s 
electoral failure on half-hearted commitment to social democracy, while the conseiwative 
wing blamed it on the party’s alliance with the left.”^^  İnönü was on the side of adopting 
‘the left o f the center stance’ against a liberal and middle-of -the-road group headed by 
Turhan Feyzioglu who claimed that the six principles of the RPP had to be given primary 
importance rather than ‘the left of the center stance’.
Soon after its election, the new government (the Justice party) faced an important test in 
its relations with the army. Demirel, with the aim o f meeting some of the wishes of his
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supporters, began to work for some sort of amnesty for the former Democi atic leaders. 
The Army, at this point, decided not to intervene further and was o f tlie opinion that the 
parliamentary procedures sliould be allowed to run their course. Accordingly, on July 
1966, an amnesty bill was passed by the parliament that pardoned over 20.000 people who 
had been sentenced in Yassiada.
If the amnesty bill was one sign of the shift towards reconciliation between the civilians 
and the army, the other sign was the economic integration achieved between the army and 
the civilian regime. One of the measures of the Menderes regime before 1960 was to 
encourage private enterprise against the state sector, a process in which the army, 
intentionally or not participated. In 1961, the NUC regime had established an Armed 
Forces Mutual Assistance Fund (OYAK) with the aim of improving the economic 
conditions of retired officers by making investments in productive enterprises. OYAK 
gradually became an important source o f investment for the private sector. This process, 
according to William Fíale, was an important factor that “...wed the army to capitalism.” 
Hale indicates that “ ...Thanks to OYAK, ...the armed forces lost their former attachment 
to economic radicalism, becoming conservative supporters of the capitalist system which
Demirel and his party espoused. UÜ1
The period mentioned, therefore, may be seen as one in which the seeds o f alienation 
between the RPP and the army began to flourish. While the RPP, as a reaction to the 
popular rise of the Justice Party, was arguing to adopt a ‘left o f the center stance’, the 
army was getting used to the policies of the Justice Party, at least, in terms of its
Hale. Turkish Poliiics. 174-17.\
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economic measures. However, this process is not sufficient to claim that the alienation of 
the army from the RPP began in those years. İnönü still attracted the sympathy of a 
considerable number of officers within the army and played an important role in holding 
the military’s attachment to his party.
2.4.4. THE CRISIS PERIOD, 1968-1971
'fhe general elections of October 1969 and Demirel’s second electoral victory left the 
opposition parties in a state of crisis.For the RPP, the crisis was due to the party’s failure 
to win a majority in any of the six general elections since 1950. İnönü was 85 years old, 
and the party needed younger cadres. His adoption of a ‘left of center” program of 
moderate social democracy shortly before the 1965 elections, was not suffiicient to 
convince the electorate. As mentioned before, this policy shift created a turmoil within the 
party, leading to an opposition from the conservative members who strongly opposed any 
kind of socialism. Accordingly, in April 1967, a group of forty-eight dissident deputies and 
senators, headed by Turhan Feyzioglu, resigned and formed the Reliance Party."’“
A more dangerous situation was also emerging on the extreme left of Turkish politics. 
The Turkish W orkers’ Party (TWP) formed in 1961, began to expand under the leadership 
of Mehmet Ali Aybar. The TWP, that won 3.0 per cent o f the vote and fifteen seats in the 
1965 elections, in the elections of 1969 fell slightly to 2.7 per cent and its parliamentary 
representation was reduced to two seats. Members of the TWP who were convinced that
Karpat, "Militan Iiucncniions. ' 145.
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they could not win power by CUnistitiitional means, decided to resort to violent revolution 
which led to the proliferation of leftist urban guerrilla groups.
Growing industrialization and rising inflation led to the emergence of strong trade 
unionism and especially to the radicalization of trade union leadership during the period. 
This process developed with the founding in 1967, the Confederation of Revolutionaiy 
Workers’ Unions, known by its Turkish acronym, DISK.'“' On 15-16 June, there were 
massive protest demonstrations by DISK unionists on the Asian side of Istanbul that 
caused to the proclamation of martial law in Istanbul and Kocaeli.
The period also saw the rise of an ultra-rightist reaction. Within the Nationalist Action 
Party, a militant youth branch was established known as the ‘commandos’ or ‘Gray 
Wolves’ who also had links with extreme religious conservatives who wished to return to 
an Islamic state.
The existence o f extremist parties, or the ideological and political polarization was not 
sufficient to create a crisis in Turkish democracy in the pre-1971 period. However, the 
transformation of these divisions within the Turkish society as waves of violence was a 
real shock. Soon a bloody confrontation appeared within the universities between left- 
wing students influenced by the youth radicalism in France in 1968, and right-wing
C. H. Dodd. The Crisis o f  Turkish Democracy (Walkinglon: Tlic Eollicn Press. 198.·)). 10.
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students wlio had strong nalionalistic/religious feelings and an inherent opposition to 
socialist-internationalism and Marxism.'"'
Demirel’s government did not appear to be strong enough to suppress the upheavals since 
the amnesty problem distracted all their attention. The amnesty problem of the former 
Democrats required a constitutional amendment that would be supported by the two- 
thirds majority in the parliament,"''’ In 1969, İnönü declared that the RPP also favored the 
proposal. According to Sakallioglu, the step was taken by the RPP in order to gain the 
support of the electorate and soften the image of the party in rightist c i rc le s .W ith  the 
two-thirds majority thus assured, the amendment was passed by the lower house on May 
14, 1969. However, while it was on its way to the Senate, on 16-17 May, the General 
Staff, through President Sunay, informed İnönü that the military strongly opposed the 
change. Under this pressure, the Prime Minister as a sign of compromise, convinced the 
Senators of his party not to support the amendment."'^ The amendment was not passed by 
the Senate until 5 November 1969.
The amnesty problem that soured the relations between the soldiers and politicians, 
coupled with the impression of the military that Demirel lost conti'ol over his own 
followers and therefore was unable to deal with the threat mounted by the extremists of 
both left and right, led to the intervention of the military on March 12, 1971.
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2.5 THE MARCH 12, 1971 ULTIMATUM
I ’he Ultimatum was broadcast on Turkish radio as follows:
“ I) Through their persistent policy, views and actions, the parliament and the 
government have driven the country into anarchy, fratricidal strife, social and 
economic unrest. In the public mind, they have destroyed the hope of reaching the 
level of contemporary civilization, which Atatürk set as our goal. 7'hey have failed to 
carry out the reforms which were envisaged in the Constitution, and have thus 
plunged the future of the Turkish Republic into acute danger,
2) The measures which are needed to end the concern and disillusionment felt about 
this grave situation by the Turkish nation and the Armed Forces which spring from its 
bosom should be assessed by our parliament in a non-partisan spirit. It is considered 
essential that a powerful and credible government should be set up, within the 
democratic rules, which will end the present anarchic situation, will take up the 
reforms envisaged in the Constitution, in the spirit o f Atatiirkism, and will implement 
reformist laws,
3) If this is not speedily undertaken, the Turkish Ai med Forces, carrying out the duty 
which is given to them by law to protect and preserve the 'Furkish republic, are 
determined to take over the administration directly.” ' “^
The 1971 coup-by-pronunciamento was made by the top generals with the aim of 
preventing a coup by the colonels. Some groups in the armed forces concluded that the 
liberal democratic system would not create real progress. The establishment of an 
authoritarian regime would make Turkey more modern and more independent. As it was 
in the previous occasions, the senior commanders did not support these views and tried to 
prevent the radicals from taking power. On March 15, 1971, three generals and eight 
colonels were dismissed from the army and were accused of breaking military law by
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violating the hierarchic meclianism, and of being engaged in political activities that were 
irreconcilable with the disciplinai^ rules of the armed forces.""
Within the armed forces, the most persistent warnings came from General Muhsin Batur, 
Commander of the Air Force. On Jaïuiaiy 25, 1970, at an unofficial meeting o f the NSC, 
he argued that a range of social and economic reforms including land and tax reform, 
nationalization o f foreign trade, and of the electoral system was needed in order to restore 
the regime. On April 24, he put forth the same arguments at a meeting of the 
Commanders.'" As law and order became to be violated more and more towards the end 
of the 1970s, he sent a memorandum to General Sunay in which he pointed to the need of 
calling all the political parties to a meeting to decide on economic and social reforms. 
However, his radical views were not totally supported by the other generals. Memduh 
Tagmac, the Chief of the General staft^ in his New Year Message in 1971, indicated that 
the anarchy would be dealt within the democratic system. So by this period, there was no 
agreement among the top commanders as to how to proceed."'
Finally it was decided that an intervention was necessary, consisting of a warning to the 
government. The basic goals of the intervention were determined to be the changing of 
government, amendment of the Constitution and of the electoral law and implementation 
o f reform s."'
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Wliat was the relation of the RPF with the army during this periocf:’ “...7 iie takeover of 
March, 1971 drew its impetus from the old tradition of the army’s association with the 
statist-elitists and the RPP.”" ‘ Muhsin Batur, in one of his conversation with Cüneyt 
Arcayurek indicated that the RPP was on the same line with the army in their views and 
that the army had realized by force what the RPP could not by democratic means. 
Batur’s depiction of the RPl’ on the same line with the army created some uproar within
the party. 116
There is a great deal of evidence showing that the army in 1971 still shared many goals 
with the RPP. Some degree of a crisis was established between the army and the RPP 
during the debates over the constitutional amendments on the amnesty for the Democrats. 
However, this does not show that the grand coalition had collapsed. In fact, during those 
years, the so-called coalition partners shared the same ends with only some degree of 
difterence in terms o f the means to achieve these ends.
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CHAPTER III: POLITICS BETWEEN 1971-1973
3.1 POLITICS B in  WEEN 1971-1973
Upon the militarv ultimatum. r)emirer.s resignation left President Sunay with the task of 
finding a reasonal)le and a neutral premier."’ Soon Sunay decided on Nihat Erim who was 
a former profes.st'r o f Public Law in .Ankara University. Erim had been elected to 
parliament in 19-1:' as a deputy from the RPP. After his resignation from the RPP, he 
generally acted in a non-partisan spirit."’'
The first Erim gc vernment w as formed by the support of both the JP and RPP. However, 
it proved to be nistable since it created some degree of doubt and confusion in both 
parties. For the Jl’, the government was illegitimate. However, Demirel had let the 
members of his party to join the cabinet since this was the only way to retain power and 
influence in the new order. On the RPP side, the party was divided into two opposing 
views concerning the memorandum. In the party, there were members who were on the 
side of the memorandum since it was a means of implementing their own program, and 
there were others who opposed the memorandum since it would lead to the linkage of the 
RPP with the armv'. İnönü's first reaction to the intervention was to criticize it. However, 
soon he changed his mind and gave his support."’ For Bülent Ecevit the March 12
'" ib id . 81.
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intervention was carried out not against the government but against himself and against 
the ‘left of the center' principle of the RFP,' "
The dispute over the memorandum was going to constitute the beginning of the change of 
the stance of the RFP in the eyes of the militaiy. The resignation ofEcevit from his post as 
a protest act to the new regime on 21 March meant that he was going to initiate an 
opposition tcT the Lriin government. From then on, the acts ofEcevit was going to lead to 
Inonii’s resignatioii from the leadershii·) of his party in November 15, 1972 and to the 
change of the R lF 's  de.stin>·.
The most important task of the Erim government other than to carry out reforms was to 
deal with terrorism. Initially, Erim rejected the idea of proclaiming martial law. However, 
under the pressures coming from the military commanders and from ‘MIT’ he soon 
changed his min.I Martial law was proclaimed on April 17 in eleven cities with almost a 
universal accepttme'e in the parliament. Between May 18 and June 17, around 2000 people 
were arrested, mostly charged under the sections 141 and 142 of the Penal Code. These 
sections
...made it heavily punishable offense to participate in ‘any society with the aim of 
establishing the hegemony of domination of social classes over the other social 
classes...or of overthrowing any of the fundamental economic or social classes... of 
overthrowing any of the fundamental economic or social orders established within the 
country or to cany on piopaganda to the same effect.
Some distinguished professors of law and politics, leaders of the Confederation of 
Revolutionary l.ab'M· ( 'nions (DISK), the Turkish Workers’ Party and the Turkish Union
Ibid., 226. 2.ti).
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of Teachers vver'.' ai rcstecl. I'he 'I'WI^ and the National Order Party were closed down on 
grounds of expiv:;; ing pro-Kurdish and Islamic fundamentalist policies respectively. Some 
other important mcastiies taken under the maitial law were restrictions on freedom of 
press, ban of strikes and susiiension of some leading newspapers.
Erim was embarrassed because of the many arrests and of the persistent evidence of the 
use of torture on suspects under interrogation. However, he was unable to interfere with 
the application ol mai tial law. In tact, this was the indication of the government’s loss of 
control over the m.-asures taken under martial law.
3.1.1. CONSTfl :;TI0N.-\I, .A.MEN'DMRM S o f  1971
Under pressure from the military and conservative parties in the government, the Erim 
government was also obliged to revise the constitution. 35 articles were changed and 9 
transitional articles were added which led to the “...a) strenghtening the powers of the 
government against threats to national unity, public order and national security; and b) 
increasing the anionomy and freedom of action of the military establishment in more or 
less subtle ways '
With the introduction of the 1971 amendments, the power of the judiciary was restricted 
to a great extent. One example was the restriction on the right o f the minor parties to
Hale. Turkish I'rliUrs. IV7
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appeal to tlie ('('iistitiitioiial ('ourl. Anolhei' example was the restriction of the review of 
the statutes con eminu ameiKlments to the ronstitution. From tlien on, these statutes 
were going to '^c suhject ol' re\'icw only in case theii' form was concerned.'·' 'fhe 
weakening of tl "; power of the jucliciar\· and strengthening of the executive and the 
legislature was a'so realized thiough gi\ ing the cabinet the power to issue decrees with the 
force of law when the parliament instructed them to do so. The strengthening of the power 
o f the executive w as also achieved by w ay of restricting the autonomy of the universities
and the TRT I.M
Regarding the am aidments introduced in 1971, the military had taken over important 
responsibilities of ti'.e ci\ ilian po\ver. According to Neper, the military’s aim was to ensure 
their autonomy I· oni the political elites since the\· knew that they could not depend on the 
civilians and the " had to maintain their professionalism within ranks. For the same end, 
“...the National Security Council,...could iu)w present to the cabinet not only information 
but “recommendations’’ as well.’·'·'
Another step taken by the military to ensure its autonomy vis-à-vis the civilians was to 
broaden the capacity of the militaiy judiciary by the introduction of the Military 
Administrative Court. Moreew er, the amendments included the broadening of the reasons
Tanor.//v7 .S(i,
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for the imposilicii ol'tlie in;ini:il law and llie increasing tlie possibility fro civilians to be 
tried in Military ' durts in pcacelime.
The amendnienis of 1971. made restriclions alsi) on the civil liberties and rights. 
Accordingly, the legal proteclit)n of the individuals were restricted while the conditions for 
the declaration cl a state of emergency and martial law softened.'’’
How did the R l'9 • 'spond to these amendments''^ As it has been mentioned before, the 
core of the I9('' ' onsiiuitii)n \.as delineated by the “Declaration on Primary Targets” 
issued by the Rid' in 19.v9 I low ever, w ith the in oposed amendments, the government and 
the army was tr\ ine to curtail the rights and the liberties put forth by this declaration. Both 
the army and t'ie go\ernment claimed that these liberties were all lux'ury and were 
responsible for li e present situation in durkey. İnönü, on the other hand, never favored 
any of these an'crdments and thus tried to prevent them as much as possible from the 
beginning. The independence of the judiciary and the autonomies of the universities and 
the TRT were, f"r İnönü, among the ones that should be exempted. Against the view of 
the army, which p-'inted to the abuse of these rights and liberties, İnönü claimed that in 
order to restore democracy, they had to be patient, thus restricting any rights and liberties
would be o f no help for Turkev. us
Bülent Tanör. " i î ' Ian Rejııni -\na\asa Deyisikliklcri.'' in , Inııa^aıı: Kamm-tı Esasi 'in 100. Yili 
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By October 1971 ihe Ib im government was reacliing the point of crisis. 7'he withdrawal 
of the JP’s five e. binet minisiei s by Demii el on 3 October reinforced tlie breakdown and 
led to the resign:'!:on of the L',o\einnient in December. On December 4, Sunay called a 
meeting atteiule l h\ 1-rim. I agmac and the ibree commanders and proposed that Erim 
should be appointed to form a new cabinet, 'fhe new government was announced on 
December 1 E ei nsisting t)f ibiir members of the Republican People’s Party besides 
ministers drawn l <'m the Justice Party, the Reliance Party, and some technocrats. In the 
official program of the government, reforms were still given primaiy importance. 
However, the fa ■ that it was de|:)endent on the support of the Justice Party and the other 
conservative par' e; in the parliament, Demiicl became the power behind the scene, while 
the RPP, despite : .'piesentati\ es in the cabinets slipped into a secondaiy role.
The new government elTected some further legal restrictions with the aim to cope with 
terrorism. On Fd ' uary 1972. a package of constitutional amendments were passed by the 
parliament which e.xtended the period of detention without charge from one week to 
fifteen days,, and allowed the establishment of special State Security Courts dealing with 
cases that would af'ect national security. Towards the end of March, a political crisis was 
created when thi- .:nn.ser\ati\e parties in the parliament blocked the reform program of the 
government and '.- 'iised its resignation on April 17, 1972.
The next govenn'ent \\as formed b\’ Ferit Melen who was more acceptable to the 
conservative gen I'als in the army. The cabinet formed by Melen received a vote of
7S
confidence on Jimc 5, consisliim of eight ministers from tlie JP, four from the RPP, two 
from the Reliain·'· Part\· and li'om some parliamentary technocrats and independents.
3.1.2. STRUGid i·; BE· rVVEBN İNÖNÜ AND t-CEVIT
By the time the '' i 'len go\eminent w as foi ined. the RPP was in a state of turmoil. After 
his resignation as the paity's secretary-general in March 1971, Bülent Ecevit had not 
ended his politic;;! ;icti\itics The struggle between him and İnönü was not confined only 
to their personali'ies. The -10 year old Ecevit was increasing his popularity among the 
younger generaiT'ii within the RPP who tried to change party’s authoritarian and elitist 
image, while co:v. ' iting it into a social democratic party. On the other side, the 88-year- 
old İnönü had ih, support of the powerful conservative faction. The first confrontation 
came to the too -.shen Ece\it rejected to give his approval to the Erim government. 
During 1971 and 1972. Ece\ it and his friends were successful in winning a considerable 
amount of support in the party council.
On May 7, 1972, İnönü, unaware of the degree of support Ecevit gained in the provinces, 
called a special pi iiy congress.'·'' For İnönü, this was a direct challenge to Ecevit since he 
asked the conge e; to change the membership of the party council in his own favor. 
However, he lo.;! the ballot b\· 709 to 408 \ otes İnönü was forced to resign as party
120Ibid..
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The importance ol' Ecevit's election as the party’s chairman was that it manifested a 
process which had started in the late 1960s. 'I'he REP under Ecevit’s secretary-generalship 
began to develop new electoi al strategies, ■. . .'fhis approach represented the efforts of the 
new leadership y m p  in the Republican People’s Party to transform that institution into a 
class party, and duis part company once and for all with the traditional bureaucratic- 
intelligentsia...Nnav significantl;,' it was an attempt to drive a wedge between the Peoples’ 
Party and the m'linny ' '
The slogan of th·. left of the center' which was first put forth by İnönü could not be 
evaluated in isoladmi from the si.\ principles of .Atatürk. According to İnönü, the RPP was 
not a socialist parly since the basic principle of socialist parties were their rejection of 
nationalism. For the RPP, how ever, nationalism was of primary im portance.C onverting  
the party to a social democratic one, for İnönü was a dangerous act that would lead the 
country to a disastrous end However, the victory o f this dispute was not İnönü. After 
Inönü’s death in 1973, the RPP gradually dropped Kemalisin as an ideology and “ ...took a 
position opposed totally to the basic tenets of the republican regime: it tended to reject the 
concept of nation and the idea that Turkey was a national state” ' ' '
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3.2 POLITICS ui; İ'w l i ;n 1973- 19S0
Although the militan .siroiigly ia\ored (he above-party governments, both Erim 
governments (Mu'vh to December 1871 and December 1971 to April 1972), the Melen 
government (Jiiii'' 1972 to .April 1973) and the Takı government (April 1973 to October 
1973) was based ■ n uncom|n-omi.ses between the existing political parties. Unfortunately, 
none of the problems that paiiiamentary democracy encountered in the late 1960s could be 
solved. After tlvw  imsuecesslul experiments, 'fiirkey came to the point of establishing a 
democratic civilian alternative.
The Turkish peiyC.- went to the polls on October 14, 1973. The results were considered to 
be a moral victoi y for Bülent Lcevit. the new leader of the RPP who pulled the party to 
the left. Howe\ a die party w as still short of forty-one seats for being the majority party. 
After several plans, a coalition between the RPP and the National Salvation Party(NSP) 
was formed on .lanuary 2.3, 1974 in which Ecevit became the prime minister and 
Necmettin Erbakan, leader of the NSP, his deputy.
Shortly after tlus establishment of the RPP-NSP coalition, a series o f disputes arose. 
Although both [ I'lt'es shared the idea that an amnesty should be issued for those convicted 
of political crini -'s by the previous martial law administration, as well as ordinary convicts, 
the two parties ■./e'le in opposition in terms of v\hich categories of political prisoners 
should be included. Some NSP ministers rejected the amnesty to include the prisoners of 
leftist persuasions The amnesty bill was brought to the Assembly on May 14, 1974 and
SI
the NSP was sm ei ssliil to exclude ieftist prisoners I'rom tlie amnesty. However, tlie R1-*F 
submitted the i|uixstion to the ('onslitulional Court claiming that the exclusion was 
contradiction ofiho constitution. .As a lesult. all prisoners of conscience were released.''''
The Cyprus cri.xis that erupted in July 1974 alTected 1'urkey’s internal politics both 
between the pariu :; and betueen the cixilian politicians and military. At first the military 
reaction to the I'.'M'-N.SP coalition was one o fa  suspicion since Ecevit was known to be a 
strong opponei i ' the Id Maich interxention, and Erbakan’s strong appeal to Islamic 
sentiment clash-d xvith the miliiaix 's commitment to secularism. This suspicion was also 
reinforced when the amnest\· bill caused around 4000 leftist-minded prisoners to be 
released.'·'' How ever, the militarx' success of the Cyprus invasion led to warm relations 
between Ecevit ar. l the Chief of the General .StalT .Semih Sancar,' ''’ since Ecevit did not 
hesitate to give the arnix' full credit for this successful operation. If the Cyprus issue 
warmed the relations betxxeen Ecevit and the army, it had exactly the opposite eft'ect on 
his relations with !7-bakan \x ho did not want Ecevit to get all the credit for this operation.
The resignation of Ecevit on September IS, due to harsh confrontation between his party 
and the NSP led Turkey with its longest governmental crisis. For almost four and a half 
months the goxernment vxas not replaced. The crisis was resolved when on March 28, 
1975 Demirel foi ried the Ilrst National Front uovernment that survived until June 1977.'’^
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One of tlie lleivi ;'rguinciils in ihe cabinet within this period was related witli the State 
Security Court' ,' !iichwere (uiuinally f(.>rmed by the Talu government in June I973.'ro 
the military, the nv-sent situation was e\en worse than the period before March 12, thus 
there was a lus' l ■ ' set up State Seeurit>' Courts.' 'fhe institution of these courts led to 
sharp disagreetii! I ts withiti the parliatnent where particular opposition came from the RPP 
and the left. I'm dt·,' RPP. the formatioti of the State Security Courts were totally opposed 
to the liberal spii it of the I Ob I Cotistitutioti ' The RPP also claimed that the government 
would use this in citution as a means to oppress the opposition.'""’ As a matter of fact, 
when Ecevit wa : "oing to lead the go\ernment in two years time (in 1978), he was going 
to propose the e.'gablishment of a Criminal Court specialized only in cases related 
toterrorism. For , ■ exit, this was a better alteinatixe to the e.xisting State Security Courts 
since these specia'i 'ed courts wsuild be impartial 'I he JP, as a reaction to the opposition, 
was always on th ■ side of the institution of these courts sinceit believed that the judges 
were not sutflci;.'n' and even if any decision was given in these courts they were wrong or 
unhealthy.'■*'
By November 19”b, the disputes over the State Security Courts came to such a deadlock 
that the govenm  -nt was not able to proceed with any other legislative work. During 
September 197(\ this dispute was carried out of the parliament when the radical labor 
confederation, IT.SK began to piotest with strikes against the Security Courts. This strike
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was preceded Iv; die fanatics related with the Nationalist Action Party who made violent 
assaults on Ixe \ it in Cierede in June 1975 and in Idazig in September 1975.
Events concernin;' the Seeurit},· Courts made the military worry about the increasing 
polarization of fiiddsh politics fhis time, different from the pre-1971 period, not only the 
JP or other minoi parties, but also the RPP was held responsible for the chaos prevalent 
within the coLinli w .Another consequence of these e\ents was that the militar)' once again 
came to the conc'n ,ion that the Demirel goveniment was not going to be able to cope with 
the problem fh'· .' \er. theii' hopes rested on the coming elections.'"*·
Demirel, with t^. same hope, proposed a bill for an early election on March 22, 1977 and 
when this was sis|'i)orted b\ fce \ it two days later, the date of the elections was fixed as 
June 5, 1977. I 'o .' exer. tiie 1977 elections also failed to produce a stable and effective 
government. Tis- cause foi· the situation from 1977 to the military intervention in 1980, 
according to William Hale, may be explained as “ ...firstly, a mounting economic crisis and, 
secondly, a catasti ophic decline in law and order, virtually amounting to a state of civil
war. U4.S
On the economic ■•phere, the fourfold increase in world oil prices during 197.3-1974 had a 
devastating effect ■■m both Turkey’s international terms of trade and the overall price
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l e v e l s .  1 'l ie  |■)Γol·kıíl w a s  lhat  t h e  g o v e r m n e n i  c o u l d  luit t a k e  m e a s u r e s  t o  o v e r c o m e  t h e
problem l-ri
The situation e\ r,n worsened al'lei 1977. Inllation rate rose to 107% that caused Turkey to 
make foreign bon inving at \ ery high interest rates. The shortage of foreign exchange also 
had a negative i ff'ct on national income. The importance of all these changes for the 
Turkish people '' as that the\' had to make theii' li\'ing in hyper-inflation conditions.
As important a.- ihe deterioration of economic conditions was the governments loss of 
control over kw ; I'd oitlei .Alihough terrorism was to a certain extent suppressed by the 
martial law adnnr.stration between 1971-1973, towaids the end of the 1970s the situation 
proved to be nr rs' frightening Many people were killed, injured and also were in panic 
due to the incids'iiis of armed robbery, kidnapping and the like. The violence Turkey was 
facing occurred in three kwels; ideological, sectarian, and ethnic. The first group was 
organizing assassinations for especially high-level university administrators and professors. 
A more fierce conliontation was the one between the leftist organizations and partisans of 
the extreme righ' The second group created a division, thus a great deal o f chaos between 
the orthodox Sunni sect and the .Alevis. The conflict between the Kurdish separatists and 
the Turkish statt’ constituted the third group which represented a serious challenge to the 
integrity of the stat
' " Ibid.. 22,7
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The results o f the early election showed that again no jiarty vvas able to gain a majority. 
Since the two l)i," I'arties w'ere not in a position to form a coalition, it vvas going to be the 
minor parties Miai would decide the outcome. In August I, 1977, Turkey saw the 
formation of tlie : econd Nationalist Front government. However, soon afterwards, the 
concessions gi\ n to l ii bakan to make him join the coalition led to defections in the JP. By 
January 5, I97i\ the goveinment had to resign due to the censure motion carried out by 
the opposition v'.ith the claim of the failure to suppress disorder and economic 
mismanagement ' ' ’ licc\ it, \sith the support of the former JP independents, formed his 
final government in JanuaiA 1978. .Although the new government tried to tackle the 
economic probi-n s. it w as not successful. The consequence of this failure was the loss of 
public support !o:· the go\eminent.
The 1970s car in,' cliaiacterized as the period of increased political polarization and 
fragmentation in the party system. The rise of political violence, resulting in frequent 
deadlocks in the parliament increased the vulnerability of the regime to a breakdown 
through a military coup.
3.2.1, THE INC ri FMEN'l' OF THE ARMY AGAINST THE RPP
Another factor a'niributing to the military coup was the politicization of the military. 
According to S ik niioglu. the politicization of the army occurred due to two measures of 
the civilian gou'rnments. One of them was the incitement of the military against the RPP
I ll:’ Hale. Turkish IM).
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by the JP. Tlic olhci' u;is ihe cmpoweriiiL’, the militiiry by way of the National Security 
Council, State Si-cnrity Courts and Martial f,aw Administrations. All these measures have 
made the militaiy 'me of the primary· actois rd'the I'urkish political life.''*^
Thé incitement of the aiiny against the RPP was based on the F<PP’s deficits regarding 
Atatürk’s principl·.,'. flie im|mrtance of this action for the JP was that they would be thus 
able to make tl·;·;' ’’ i^ P to lose their high esteemed status in the eyes o f the military. Why 
did the JP feei t!' · need to destroy the alliance between the RPP and the military? 
According to Salm'lioglu, the reason was that the JP was afraid of Ecevit’s rising image 
both throughout tiio country and the army. In fact, the fragmentation and the polarization 
o f political life dming the Nationalist Front governments, partisanship and the anti­
secularist actions <'f the N.SP had created a .sympathy in the lower ranks of the army for 
the RPP. Howewr. the arm\' was also divided in this respect since one could not talk 
about the e.xistenc.' of aii\ .sx inpathy for the RPP among the high ranking officers. Also, 
increasing terrorism in the period of Ecevit’s last government that lasted 22 months and 
Ecevit’s failure to deal with these problems resulted in the deterioration of this 
sympathy.'·*^ The .IP indicated that the RPP falsely claimed to be an Atatiirkist party 
although it was not ansinore since it deviated from Atatürk’s principles; it was against 
nationalism and piguilisin and it also embraced leftism and communism. Further, the RPP 
during those yeai s had used the C\prus victory for its own political ends.
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The counter giic·'i INa (lispiiies were also an important source lor tlic JI^  to incite the army 
against tlie RPP. i nese dispuies weie put on the agenda by llcevit since 1973, however, 
by February 197:;, 'he\· ueie  liroiighi to a jnek point Behind tliese disputes was Bcevit’s 
suspicion of the r i ’hiisl aeii\ isis I'or Fcevit, lliere was an invisible body called “Ozel Harp 
Dairesi” and the eiHinier guerrilla organized by it which was not under or responsible to 
civilian authority aad which provoked these rightist activists. Ecevit also suspected that 
the Chief of the <'cneral Sialf had some amount of control over this body. Thus, Ecevit 
had demanded fro·' the ( ieneral StaITto open this body to civilian scrutiny, and in 1978 he 
asked the Chief of die (ieneial Stalf, Kenan Evren, to dissolve it. This opportunity was 
used by Demirel accuse the Rl’P if interfering of the business of the military.
The reaction of il·· se aiiacks on the military was given by Kenan Evren as he stated that 
“what is called in· coimtei- guerrilla is the “Ozel Harp Dairesi Teskilati” established in 
1952. The exprc.sfon of counter guerrilla has been made up afterwards and it has been 
used to exhaust tiie armv. Unfortunately the RPP also seems to believe in these intentional 
declarations.” '^" I hus. the politicized army began to give reactions against the RPP due to 
disputes over the cwuntei' guerrilla issue.
3.2.2, THE M.AP.TI.Al, 1..AW' .lOlNT ADMINISTR.ATION AND THE RPP
The intercommunal massacie that started on December 19, 1978 in Kahramanmaraş and 
some other events occurring in other parts of d urkey like Malatya, Sivas, and Elazig the
I-I·'■''Ibid.. 136-137.
same year, led lo yt' ayainsl his liberal insliiicts as he felt the necessity to declare
martial law in thirteen prox iiK Cs of the country. .Another conscc|uence of the declaration 
of martial law was die resentment it created within the party.
The renewal o f  the. martial law at two-months inter\ als hy the parliament and its extension 
to 19 provinces, togelhei with the formation of'the Martial Law' Joint Administration 
under the control of the I’rime Ministry had become the focus of the actions of the JP in its 
attempts to incite the arm\ ayainst the RPP. 'fhe accusation of the JP regarding this issue 
was the RPP's la' i.; declaratieiii of the martial law , jeopardizing the eftectiveness of martial 
law by setting up die Martial l.aw Joint Administration and not consulting the National 
Security Council h' fore imiking the decision.''"
However, for tlic Rl’lf liie reasons for this chaotic situation was the failure of the 
application of the ! ‘X)I (. onsiitution. the socio-economic instabilities and rightist activities
under the NAP ;uid the lese cotisiderations of the RPP had resulted in refraining
from declaring maatial law before. Under this, also lies the desire to purify their 
authoritarian image of the single-party period. The indication of this desire was made by 
Ecevit in one of hi.; speeches in 1976. Ecevit in his speech indicated that we are and we 
will be against tl·' declaration of the martial law in this countiy. If in the future the 
circumstances womd necessuaie such a declaration, the responsibility would be on the
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ones who goveri: Ihe counii\ or w lio biing the coimlry to this point.” However, after 
the Kahramanına:·,I.·, ineiileni l-A-cx il felt obliged to declaie martial law.
Although Fxevii declared martial law, he tiied to present the situation within as 
democratic a iVame as possible. This was why he referred to the martial law 
administration as Joint administration’ which meant that the martial law commanders had 
to inform the go-x- 'inment and get their appro\al before they took any action.”...The 
commanders com dained that this meant they were unable to do their job properly, and 
that the enforeen i nt of martial hiw was undermined by interference from the civilian 
authorities,"'^'* f.\ t en, as a response to Ecevit's declaration that the democratic rules 
would not be violated e\en under martial law, questioned why the government would do 
so, then why did ti'ryv feel the necessity to declare martial law.'''
Disputes regardin the martial law administration was a good source for the JP to attack 
the RPP and the military. Claiming that the army v\ as on the side of the RPP and that the 
militar>' lost its impartiality, led to resentment within the army. Kenan Evren in his 
memoirs, mentions Demirel's attacks on the impartiality of the army as an event which
worried both himself and also the other officers IV,
By the beginning of Ma\' Id7d, it was clear that the only way to overcome the crisis in 
Turkey was military intervention However, there were disputes over whether events had
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reached such a slrl ■ or nol I luis altliougli Fvien was sure that it would be impossible to 
defeat anarchy and iern)i ism under the present regime, he decided to wait. Intervening just 
before or after llu partial senate elections would put the legitimacy of such an action into 
danger. Ecevit s 'laiuhnei· of power to Demirel after the partial senate elections also 
reinforced this derision .Since they did not act against Hcevit, they also had to give 
Demirel a chance, ntherw ise they would be blamed of not acting impartially.
However, during I »emiiefs temi. political terrorism was still the most important problem 
throughout the co'mtiy. fhe militaiy finally decided to send a warning letter to President 
Fahri Korutiirk en December after discussions of whether to repeat their actions as 
in March 12, 1ST! or not In the message, the commanders demanded from the political 
leaders to unite ag iinst lerrorism in order to restore order. What the military opted for 
was a coalition between the JP and the RPP, but this proposal was not an indication of 
their full trust in the coalition's solving the p r o b le m s .T h e  latter was broadcast in 
January 2, 1980, lunvever, it was left without effect.
As a matter of fact. Ecevit did not reject the idea of forming a coalition with the JP, on the 
contrary, he had en lier announced that he opted for it.' '^'' However, Demirel turned down 
the idea and indicated that he would enact laws as soon as possible and bring violence 
under control. .As lime went on. it became clear that his intention was to press for early
Ibid., 250.
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elections since lie had the hope of winning it due to his performance in the partial senate 
elections. In June, Ecevit and Erbakan engaged in dialog with the aim of forming an 
alternative coalition, but they failed. In the same month Ecevit again turned to Dernirel 
renewing his siigg‘':<tion ol'a coalition, but was again rejected.
Why did Ecevit favor to form a coalition with the JP? To answer this question, one should 
first consider tlic intra-party confiict within the RPP that Ecevit was confronting. 
Secondly, the chiuuic situation that prevailed in 'furkey should be kept in mind. If a 
coalition was formed, Ecevit felt that he was both going to share the burden of terrorism 
with the JP and also to suppre,ss the intra-party resentment since under a coalition, his 
leadership would l>e legitimized in the party. Thus, Ecevit who suspected a possible coup, 
increased his in.'fstence on a coalition. However, for Demirel, there was no such 
possibility. He onl)· wanted an early election since he hoped to w'in but for this end he 
needed the collabcu ation of Ecevit for the enactment of the laws that would help the JP to 
come to power alone
The presidential election crisis on April 1980 left Turkey with another crisis. With Ecevit’s 
reflisal for early elections and the impossibility of a reconciliation between the political 
leaders, the political confusion took serious forms. In the following 5 months, the 
Assembly held around 115 rounds of voting but no candidate was able to achieve the 
absolute majority of both chambers required for.
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As the time for ioieivention cnmc nearer, the army was again sliocked by an anti-secularist 
move of the NSIf On 0 Seplemlier. lirbakan led a massive demonstration in Konya where 
he called for the cstablishmeni of an Islamic s t a t e . W h a t  made the events more 
dangerous was that Erbakan seemed to be in alliance with Ecevit against the Demirel 
government. Acemding to Iw ren. what Ecevit did was to encourage the NSP in order to 
prevent it from Ibrming a coalition with the JP, Ecevit flirted with the NSP to form a 
coalition since theii' \ otes together vveic enough to make the majority, Ecevit knew that 
the army would not consent to such a coalition. "’“Ecevit’s concessions to a party which 
acted against the seculai ist nature of the state with the aim of preventing the JP to hold on 
to power was an iniportant I'actor that caused further alienation of the army from the RPP.
Ecevit’s speech in a meeting of the petroleum workers union, in which he compared 
political struggle to a football match and invited the workers to 'come down from the 
stands and onto the pitch'.'"' was going to be considered by the military as the final 
legitimation of the coup. Ecevit was acting in a highly irresponsible manner in calling the 
workers to the sia eets.
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The RPR began U' undergo a llmdamenlal change afler the re,signation of İnönü from the 
government, 'fhe ;agn.s of the change can be traced back to 1964 when such topics as land 
reform, social justice, social sccuiity, economic development, democratic etatism, 
education, seculaiism, the fine arts, nationalism and youth, began to be discussed 
especially by the two raising siai s within the party, Turhan Feyzioglu and Bülent Ecevit.'^^
The elections of I96.â showed that the professionals, landlords and local notables, who 
were the important sup|ioi teis of the RPP in the countryside did not like the policy 
adopted by the younger members of the party. Flow ever, İnönü’s leadership of the RPP, 
prevented them fom  taking back their support despite the ideological direction taken by 
the party.
Another challenge for the RPP came from the left. In the elections of 1965, the Turkish 
Workers Party (TWP) was able to capture 3 percent of the total vote The LP relied on a 
Marxist philosophy and appealed to some students, intellectuals and some trade unions. 
Also due to their attacks on the West and NATO and their appeal to rapid development, 
social justice and the patriotic feelings aroused by the Cyprus crisis, they were able to 
attract the attention of the population. Morover, they were also successful in mobilizing 
the younger ca Ires of the RPP. 'fhe RPP lost the membership of mostly university 
students, who were unhap|)y and dissatisfied with the conservatism and the policies of the
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party. Tlie.se Linivorsit\· sliitleiils began (o leave (lie RI’P and join the LF. Thus the only 
way of keeping these siudenis w ithin the party, the RPP had to give more importance to 
social and economic concei ns of the young, d'lierelbre, in the elections of 1965, the party 
proclaimed the previously discussed ‘'ortanin solu” (‘deft of the center”) policy.’^ *'
İnönü was the priniaiy figui c among the ones promoting the ‘left of the center’ policy. In 
fact, there were hoi debates regarding whether to adopt this policy or not. İnönü was able 
to convince the op|)osition in (he party. Although the failure of the RPP in the elections of 
1965 was attribiiicd to the adoption of this policy, the party was going to continue on its
way. 1 6 7
This switch to the left eventually evolved to social democracy and then to democratic 
leftism and further to left in order to keep the radicals within the party, to appeal to new 
people and to prevent the formation of a rival leftist party. All these measures alienated the 
moderate and the conservative faction in the RPP. “... Meanwhile the RPP sought to build 
for itself a broad, social base among the workers and possibly, the peasantry. Doing on 
about face from its previous position, the RPP began advocating the workers involvement 
in politics. It tried to politicize even the Tiirk-ls ( Confederation of Trade Unions) causing 
considerable dissension amoim workers.” '*’*
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İn May 1972, lnr)im l'dı the need to lesign as chaii nian ol’the |)arly since lie was unable to 
eliminate Ecevil. I he resignation ol'lnonii who was the close associate of Atatürk and the 
architect of dcmoci acN'. w tis a sing, of a dramatic cluinge both regarding the direction of 
the party and regarding tlie lelaiions between the RPP and the military. After the death of 
İnönü in 1973, the RIM’ became totally alienated from the conservative parties.'''"^
Historically, the RPl’ was closel)' identified with the Kemalist state and thus was 
considered to be tlie guai tlian of the state. This was in fact important for the military since 
they saw themse!\ es on the same path. How ever, the leftward shift of the RPP caused the 
military to vie\' ihe part\ as an antistatist one. /Vccording to Metin Heper and Frank 
Tachau,
...As politi'ai polari/ation deepened during the I970's and the labor movement 
suffered spasms of organized violence, the RPP seemed to move further from its 
traditional l ole as guardian of the state. This development, along with the previously 
noted inability of goxernment to maintain or impose its authority, must have been 
unsettling to the militar\· It opened unprecedented breach between them and the RPP 
and reinforced the militar\· s conception of themselves as the prime guardian of the
Atatiirkist state and ideals The way was thus open for the coup which ultimately
1 ·)·))/() occurreci.
3.2.4.CHANGEMS 1 \  THE MILITARY
The alienation of the militais from the RPP cannot be e.xplained only in terms of the 
deviation of the RPP to the left It was mentioned above earlier that the army was 
politicized by the major political parties in the pre-l9S0 period and that in order to adapt
169 Ibid..
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themselves to I he changinu w orld conditions, they Irecame ‘contemporary rightists’ 
favoring tlie market ecoiurmy. According to He|)er, the Army Mutual Assistance 
Association (0 ^ ’AK) may be considered to be as ¡'¡art of the efforts of the military to 
decrease their dependence on 'civil society’.'^'
The military had been kept out of politics by Atatürk and İnönü both in the single party 
and the multi-pai ty periods It has been many times indicated by the militaiy that they were 
not willing to inteiA'ene unless ihey felt obliged. However, both during the 1960s and 
1970s the militai·}' has always been closely interested in Turkish politics. Thus Turkish 
politics cannot be. considered as one completely autonomous liberal democracy since some 
key decisions were made not in consultation, but with the consent of the militaiy. For 
example, the decisions for the Cyprus issue were taken by military consent. On the other 
hand, the militaiy had several times pointed to their impartiality, indicating that they do 
not have ties with an)· political party. For example, when in 1979, the then Prime Minister 
Bülent Ecevit tried to bring to the command the generals who showed their interest to his 
party and ideology, the Military Council (Askeri Sura) appointed generals who were 
known to be neutral in terms of any affiliation with a political party. Consequently, “...as 
compared with other institutions, the militaiy in Turkey has proved to be unique in 
undergoing change so early and so profoundly but yet in managing to preserve its sense of 
historical continuit)· and collective identity.”
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Since party competition and elections were important sources of political legitimacy in 
Turkey, the military would intervene only when everybody show that the civilian 
administrations cannot handle the political problems. Also when the generals made public 
that the 1980 interx'ention was an attempt to restore democracy but not to destroy it, they 
had to keep their word” ' since acting otherwise would ruin their image in the large 
sections of Turkish opinion.
3.3 THE 12 SEPTEMBER 1980 MILITARY IN I ERVENTION
By early September 1980, it vxas evident that the crisis situation was hardly possible to be 
resolved by democratic means. The ‘Operation Flag’ is described by Mehmet Ali Birand as 
follows:
...For the third time in twenty years, the airwaves carried the patriotic army march 
“Forward Turk, Forward. . .” across the breadth and length of the country. It was far 
too early to ascertain whethei' the country was going forward as the march suggested 
or taking a step backward with the impending suspension of parliamentary 
democracy. But for the Turkish citizens who heard the dawn broadcast and for the 
rest who would tune in during the next two to three hours as the nation woke up to 
another day (04:00 hours), a sign of relief and a hearty “And about time, too” seemed 
to be the ovei"whelming initial reaction. The deep-voiced announcer informed the 
nation that a'new and a totally different chapter in the country’s history had started.” '’
Evren announced that the armed forces had ‘invoked the power granted to them by the 
internal Service Code to protect and look after the Turkish republic’ by dissolving the
‘'■'Ibid.. 129.
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parliament and government. Maitial law was declared throughout the country.'^'' Evren, in 
his broadcast, promised to turn the country to a liberal, democratic and secular one where 
human rights and [Veedoms were respected It was also promised that a new Constitution, 
Electoral Law, Political I’arties .Act would be jnepared and legislative arrangements would 
be made. Therefore, the militaiy had four main targets:
1) Suppressing terroiism; 2) lestoring economic growth and stability; 3) introducing a 
new Constitution and the necessary legal arrangements that would prevent the country to 
get into another crisis; -1) working out eifective arrangements with the civilians.
A Law on Constitutional Oidei- which w'asissued on 27 October, formalized the birth of 
the new regime. The NSC was reconstituted and vested w'ith legislative powers that could 
issue decrees having the force of law. Evren became the head of state and together with 
the four members of the junta the temporary ruler of the country on 18 September.” ’
An immediate task of Evren and his colleagues was the appointment of a civilian cabinet 
that would cany on the administration of the countiy under the junta. After some initial 
efforts to let the cabinet be formed by Turban Feyzioglu (leader of the Republican 
Reliance Party) the\' soon changed their mind as Feyzioglu would be hardly acceptable in 
the eyes of the public. .According to Birand, the junta made contacts with both Orhan 
Eyiiboglu from the RPP and the Kamuran Inan from the JP, who were known to have 
opposed their own party leaders Although Eyiiboglu accepted the invitation, Inan reflised 
because Demirel, who was under custody signalled him not to cooperate. This led to
176 Ibid., 241. and Fi\Tcn. Kc'/u/ii ¡■'vren 7// Aiiilari L 546-^47.
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Evren loosing Iiis patience with tlic civilian politicians.'^^ At the end retired Admiral 
Bülend Ulusu announced his cabinet on 21 September consisting of non-partisan 
technocrats.
As the first cabinet was ibrmed, the military regime first put an end to political violence.
The first .step \\'as to give moie power to martial law commanders.
These now included the right to ban strikes, public meetings and demonstrations, 
suspend newspapers and other publications, and to dismiss local and central 
government .staff whose emiiloyment was deemed undesirable without right of appeal. 
Martial law courts were L>i\en the right to try ideological offenses bid down in 
Sections 141 and 142 of the Penal Code... and arrangements were made to speed up 
trials under martial lav\. To end the political polarization which had virtually paralyzed 
the police, the Law on the Organization of Police Forces was also amended so as to 
bar the police from membership of any organizations except sports clubs.
A most frequent action of the martial law commanders was to suspend newspapers. 
Another action was to bring the universities under the control of a new Higher Education 
Law which meant that from then on, they would be dependent on the state.
3.4 RECONSTRUCTION OF FI IE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
From the beginning Evren had promised to handover power to civilian government 
immediately after a new C'onstitution was made and other necessary laws were enacted. 
Consequently in October 1981, a Consultative Assembly was convened. However, the 
Consultative Assembl)' of 1981 was veiy different from the one of 1961. This time, the
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Constituent Assembly consisled of only the Consultative Assembly and the NSC. “...In 
theory the ('onsultati\e .Assembly shared legislative powers with the NSC, though in 
practice the fmal say rested w ith Cvien and his colleagues. Moreover, the 160 members of 
the Assembly were eithei' hand-picked by the junta or else nominated by provincial 
governors, who had themselves been appointed by the generals.” '*'" How the preparation 
and the basic aspects of the 1982 Constitution differ from its predecessor and in what 
ways it renected the alienation ol'the army from the RPP will be examined in the following 
section.
The way the political leaders have been treated by the military regime after the 1980 coup 
also depicts in a considerable extent, the solitude of the military. Leaders of the existing 
political parties were interned immediately after the coup. However, for the generals, 
another important problem w as the possibility of these leaders to be brought back to the 
political scene eventually. Foi' Evren, the closed parties would re-establish themselves 
under different names just as the Democratic Party had done after the 1960 coup.'*' Thus 
it was soon decided tt> prevent them from doing so wdth a formal ban on political leaders 
re-entering politics in October 1982. So the military this time was putting forth no 
difference in their attitudes to any party reversing their stance after the 1960 coup.
Although Demireps reaction to the ban was rather quiet, the same could not be claimed 
for Ecevit. Resigning from the chairmanship of his party on 30 October 1980, he began 
editing a w'eekly magazine under the name ‘Arayis’ where he made criticisms of the
Ibid.. 256.
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military regime. The reachoii ol' ilie NSC: was to issue a decree forbidding the former 
politicians from making any siaicincnts about the past or future political or legal system of 
Turkey on 2 June kiSI. The military believed that the pre-coup political parties had 
weakened the slate, divided the citizenry, and promoted emnity among themselves. 
According to Karpat, for the military, the problem was that they tended to express the 
special interests of social oi economic groups or particular regions of the countiy whereas 
they should have stressed national unity, order and stability.'* '^
3.5 THE 1982 CONSTITUTION
The military interxention on 12 September 1980 was made with the aim of replacing a 
malfunctioning democracx in the pre-1980 period with a completely new democratic 
system. According to the military, the crisis situation was due to both the inability of the 
politicians and the inadequacx· of the Constitution.
As it was indicated earlier, a Constituent Assembly was established on 30 June 1981 with 
the aims of 1) preparing a new constitution; 2) preparing an electoral law; 3)preparing a 
Political Parties Law; and 4) making amendments or repealing laws.
The Consultative AssembK of 1980 aroused disputes since its members had not been 
elected by the people, but were lather appointed by the NSC. According to Bülent Tanör, 
the Consultative Assembly was a body that had no affiliation with political parties or with
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any other organizution. Also the Assembly did nol include of any members from the 
media, the univeisities, trade unions, e t c . ' I ' h u s ,  the Assembly could not be considered 
as being representalive of the Turkish nation.
This analysis of the context of preparation of the 1982 Constitution (as it was in the case 
of the 1961 Cemsiitution) points to the alienation of the army from all the civilians 
including the political parties Otherwise, a full analysis of the constitution falls outside the 
scope of this thesis.
It is clear that the military reacted to the excessive rights and liberties stipulated in the 
1961 Constitution and blamed these clauses to be responsible for the crisis situation of the 
1970s. For the military this indicated the erosion of state authority. Thus, they now aimed 
to create a "strong state and a strong executive.”
Whereas the 1961 Constitution declared the supremacy of the Constitution and the 
independence of the judiciary, the 1982 Constitution accepted the supremacy of the 
executive and decreased the power of the judiciary'. According to Heper, “...a two-tiered 
executive that was established by the 1980 intervenors should be seen in this light. The 
1982 Constitution strengthened the role of the president and the National Security Council 
(both representing the state elites) vis-à-vis the Council of Ministers and the Parliament 
(representing the political elites)
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As it has been mentioned bclore, tlie 1980 military coup was a reaction to political 
polarization, violence and the crisis that alTlicted the country during the 1970s. With the 
aim of preventing the rccm lencc of the same situation again, Political Parties Law and 
Electoral Law was pre|iared by the Consultative Assembly. According to George Harris, 
however, to regard the 1982 Constitution as more authoritarian than the one in 1961 
would be a mistake since the latter provided a model for the former. Whatever adjustment 
was made by the 1982 Constitution, the objective was to end any parliamentary deadlock 
through elections l athei' than "to restrict the options and the ability of the electorate to 
express its desiie.s."”'''
The political parlies were accused of : 1) weakening the state; 2) dividing the citizeniy; 
and 3)promoting enmity among themselves. Therefore, the junta felt the necessity to 
create a totally different part\· s\ stem so that it w ould be possible to heal the results of the 
“mistaken notion of demociacy” depicted by the old parties. All the political parties, 
including the RPP, consisted of oligarchic groups that led the countiy to this chaotic 
situation. Instead of these parties that proved to be incompetent in many instances, new 
parties that were inspired from .Atatiirkism should be on the political scene.'**’
General Evren, in his opening of the Consultative Assembly, indicated that the new 
Electoral Law was as important as the Constitution. The concessions that the bigger 
parties gave to the smaller parties to hold political otfice were the consequences o f the 
parliamentary bi eakdow ns faced many times in the 1970s. The new Electoral Law adopted
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by the NSC retained the ‘ d ’l loiult” version of'proportional lepresentation that is known 
to favor larger pai ties. However, with new modifications made by the new Electoral Law 
this feature was much more stressed. The most important modification was the 
introduction of the national i|iiotient threshold which meant that political parties receiving 
less than 10% of the nationw ide total valid votes w'ould obtain no seats in the TGNA, This 
modification was clearly made as a reaction to the proliferation of the political parties, 
which, in the eyes of the council, was responsible for the crisis encountered during the 
1970s. In fact, the council preferi ed a party system which consisted of two or three parties 
for a stable governmeni. .A second modification introduced by the Electoral Law was the 
“constituency thicshold " in which the total valid votes received in each constituency is 
divided by the numbei t)f seats in the same constituency. The parties or the independent 
candidates that fell below the quotient were not given any seats in that constituency.'**’*
An important characteristic of the 1982 Constitution was the enlarged role given to the 
militai7  in the form of the National Security Council that consisted of the president of the 
republic, the prime minister, the Chief of the General Staff, the ministers of Foreign 
Affairs, Interior, and Defense, and the Commanders o f Land, Air and Naval Forces and 
the Gendarmerie. It was made necessary that the Council of Ministers “consider with 
priority the decisions of the National Security Council concerning necessary measures for 
the protection of the existence and the independence of the state, the unity and
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indivisibility of die counir\ ;iikI tlie peace and security of society,” '^ *'' In the 1961 
Constitution, the NSC prox icled advice to tlie CNnincil of Ministers; after the 1971-1973 
amendments, the same liod\· provided recommendations; iinally, their powers were 
increased in the 1982 Constitution, as indicated above, where the Council of Ministers 
should give priority consideration to the decisions of the NSCf
The notion of “national secuiity“ was bioadened by the C’onstitution so as to include 
internal peace and securit\' along with the preservation of integrity and indivisibility of the 
country This m ,'asure w as also a clear manifestation of the military concern of preventing 
of the resui rection of the crisis situation faced before the 1980 coup.
As the declaration of martial law was an important source of problems between the army 
and the civilians in the l97os, the new Constitution made its declaration much easier. 
From then on, the commanders of Martial Law were going to exercise their duties under 
the authority of the OlTice of the Chief of General Staff, whereas previously they used to 
be accountable to the Pi ime Minister.
Another important introduction of the 1982 Constitution which affected the relationship 
between the military and the cixilians was the enhanced role given to the president. The 
president was given the responsibility o f “safe-guarding the security and independence of 
the country of the people, the rule of law and democracy, “the secular Republic guided by 
the tenets and reforms of .Atatürk,” and human rights and public welfare.” A number of
İS9Tachaii and Mc'in llcpci. "The Siaio.“ 28-29.
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legislative and executive powers were given to the president. These included: to veto 
legislation passed by the parliament; to submit constitutional amendments proposed by the 
parliament to populai' refei endum; and to challenge the constitutionality of parliamentary 
legislation, the legal decrees of the cabinet and also the internal regulations of the 
parliament by ajipealing to the constitutional court; to call new elections; to appoint the 
prime minister; to convene the Council of Ministers as well as the NSC; to appoint the 
Chief of the Genci al Staff and some higher civil servants, the chairman and members of 
the State Super\ isory Commis-aon.''’"
The president was also empow ered to use the Armed Forces in case the country faced an 
armed aggression The abolishment of the Senate that created a vacuum that could be 
occupied by a candidate IVom outside the parliament, according to Bülent Tanör, could 
have been made deliberately ai ranged by the militar>· since all the presidents, except one, 
until that time were of military background. The enlarged role granted to the president 
could also be explained from this view.'^'
An important feature of the 1982 Constitution was the loosening of the power of the 
judiciary due to the judicial powers granted to the president. According to the new 
Constitution, the members of the most important judicial organs of the country were 
appointed by the president ' ‘
Ibid.. 29.
Tanör. Iki Anavds:! I90!-I‘js2. 122.
192 Ibid.. 121.
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The politicization and the polaiization tliat alHicted the civil service due to the measures 
taken by the political pai ties led the military to establish a Supreme Board of Supervision 
through which the president was able to watch the functioning of the bureaucracy. Also 
the martial law commandeis weie uiven the riuht to remove or to reassign civil servants.''^’
The 1982 Constitution consisted ol'restrictive provisions by the enactment of such laws as 
the Trade Unioii Law, and the Law on Collective Labor Agreements, Strikes and 
lockouts. The ban on political aetix ities of the unions and the declaration of strikes with 
political objectives depicted the military’s opposition to anything related to Marxism. 
According to one proxision there could be no political links between these kind of 
institutions and the political pai ties including that they would not receive financial support
from each other 19!
Despite the fact that the 1982 Constitution arouse disputes over its undemocratic nature, it 
was designed to axaiid the crisis situation of the past. With this aim, the military abolished 
the Senate and brought unicameralism, empowered the president to call for new elections 
if the government lost vote of confidence, and no other was formed within forty-five days, 
and modifying the system of electing the president (seven years of term office with no 
reelection) was a measure put forth as a reaction to the presidential election crisis of the 
past.
Tachau and Mciin Heixcr. "The siaie." .SO. 
Ozbudim. "Dexclopincnl orDenmaalic." 27.
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The military’s disiiusl of the picx ious political parties was also evident in the Political 
Parties L,avv that yave the NSC the right to veto the Ibimcling members of new political 
parties. Finally (mly three pai lies w ere able to compete in the elections and the parties that 
were the successors to the .IP (the True Path Party) and to the RPP (the Social 
Democratic Party) were e,\cluded. This action on the part of the military was a final 
display of the animosity towards the JP and the RPP,
In terms of Eiic Nmdiinger's t\pology, the 1980 military intervention fits into the 
“Guardian” regime. We cannot sa\· that the military regarded itself either as moderator or 
ruler. The milita' v in 1980 had the aim of renun ing the corrupt and excessively politicized 
politicians and make modilications on both the governmental and bureaucratic machineiy 
in order to obtain greater efficiency. They felt the necessity to correct what they saw as 
responsible for the deficiencies of the previous government. General Kenan Evren 
perceived the military' as the guaidian of Atatiirk’s ideals indicating that they would never 
allow traitors to assume control of the Turkish Republic which they inherited from 
Atatürk, It was reiterated that the Turkish Armed Forces was going to guard this Republic 
against both internal and external enemies.
The RPP had also shared with the military this guardian role since it had been established 
by Atatürk until the 1970s, However, the resignation of İnönü from the leadership of the 
party and his replacement In a young civilian, Bülent Ecevit who advocated democratic 
socialism, moved the part\ from its traditional role as guardian of the state, Ecevit’s 
strong affinity wiih organized labor, his advocacy of democratic socialism and his
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alignment with groups opposing established authority were the most important factors 
which left the military alone in its guardian role.
The RPP's closure b>' the NSC after 1980 ‘'was the final act that sealed the fate of this 
party which had played a signilicant role in the history of the R e p u b l ic .T h e  acceptance 
of the victoiy of the Motherland Party in the elections of 1983 marked a new phase in 
Turkish history.
195 Karpat, "Militar} lnler\cnin':i>.
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Military iiiterveiil ion is a pİK'iıonıcııon tliat cannot be analyzed only in terms of its internal 
dynamics. The social and |iolitical conditions in which militaiy interventions occur are also 
important sources in the examination of civilian military relations. As important as the 
social and economic circLimstances are, another important factor that should be taken into 
consideration is the acts and altitudes of the political leaders between themselves since 
their coopeiatioii is an impoi iant determinant in the elimination of the possibility of a 
military intervention. The loason why on the three military interventions in Turkey was 
taken up is that they reveal ti) a great extent the nature of the relations between the armed 
forces and political parties
The evolution of the relationship between the military and the Republican People’s Party 
may be analyzed in two phases. .As was depicted in chapter 1, the military and the RPP 
had formed an informal alliance the roots of which can be traced back to the period of 
Ottoman Empire, vvithin the reformist political culture during the turn of the century.
At the time of the Ottoman period the military was an important part of the state power 
thus an important partner of state authority. They were also considered to be the vanguard 
of the modernization attempts of the period. These two factors in turn played an important 
role in the military’s perception of themselves as the ultimate guardian of both the state 
and the principles of .Atatın k and therefore to the RPP which was established by Atatürk 
to implement the reforms he wanted to materialize in the country. Thus the RPP also
CONCLUSION
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assumed tiie same role that the military did, i.e. the role of guardianship of the new regime. 
Accordingly, tho- Turkish armed forces vveie given by law the duty of “defending the 
Republic of Tuikcy againsi both its external and internal enemies and watching over its 
fortunes”.
The military in Turkey acted in loyalty to conformity with the country’s role of watching 
over its fortunes. How ever w hat is important in respect to the subject matter of this thesis 
is that while doing so the 'furkish militaiy collaborated with the RPP until the 1970s. 
Although many ex'ents listed in chapter 2 reveal this alliance, the military was always 
sensitive to the claims that it was pro-RPP. The NUC always insisted that it was impartial 
and in many instances it tried to demonstrate this impartiality. However, as it severely 
needed to build upon the experiences of the RPP, it began to be identified more and more 
with the party. The identification of the activities of the NUC with the RPP after the 1960 
military intervention was not only due to the actions of either the military or the RPP. In 
some instances, the events themselves organically worked to identify their activities such 
as the Yassiada trials, where the acts of the DP directed against the RPP were on trial.
At this point it should be indicated that there was always a section within the military who 
acted contraiy to İnönü although İnönü, the great hero of the National Independence War, 
and the close associate of .Atatürk had a good reputation in their esteem. The reason for 
this confrontation was because İnönü was acting as a moderator in the relations between 
the civilians and military, F oi some radical officers. İnönü was making concessions to the 
civilians and was betraying .Atatiirk's legacy. However, it may be claimed that the majority
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of the army, most impoi taiit ol'all. tlie upper echelons of the army still admired İnönü and 
showed tlieii' respect to him and the RPP.
The 1960s can I 'c. considered as the time in which seeds of alienation between the RPP and 
military began to llourish On the one hand, the reaction to the popular rise of the JP was 
to adopt a ‘left of the ceniei stance’ through which the RPP hoped to regain the votes it 
had lost. On the oilier hand, ihe aiiny was getting used to the economic policies of the JP. 
In fact, during Mendeies goveinment, the aimy was already becoming familiar with 
capitalism and adapting itself lo it. As it is indicated in chapter 2, the establishment of the 
Armed Forces Mutual Assisiance Fund (OYAK) may be considered as an example of the 
changes beginning to occui· in the army’s attitude.
During the takeover of .March 1971 the arm)' still shared many goals with the RPP. 
However, this time there w as a ditference, since some degree of differences were evident 
between the army and the RPP in terms of the means to achieve these ends.
Disputes over the coup-by-memorandum may be considered to be the beginning of the 
change in the stance of the RPP in the eyes of the militaiy. Ecevit’s resignation from his 
post as a protest act to the 2 I March regime and his behaviour from then on was going to 
lead to İnönü's resignation from his party and the change in RPP's destiny.
Ecevit’s aim was to change the party’s authoritarian and elitist image, making it a social 
democratic partv, and to pre\ ent his party from being considered in close relationship with
the army. Togeihcr with liuhui s death in 197.i, the RPP gradually drop Kemalisin as an 
ideology and became opposed to the basic tenets of the republican regime.
Chapter 3 delineated the partieular events that caused the alienation of the RPP from tlie 
military. However, the alienation of the army liom the RPP cannot be explained only in 
terms of the deviation of the RPP to the left. The army had been politicized by the political 
parties in the pro-1980 iieriod In addition, in order to adapt themselves to the changing 
world conditions they liecame rightists’, favoring the market economy.
As the 1980s approached, ihe I urkish army was in a position of considering itself totally 
isolated from all the political inii ties in terms of its self assigned role of being the prime 
guardian of the Atatiirkist slate and ideals. Although until the 1970s, they shared this role 
with the RPP, in the I98()s the\' were totally convinced that they were alone in this 
mission.
In an interview with a retired general who w'as a lieutenant in the 1960s, the guardianship
role of the milita ry has been explained as follows:
... The safeguarding of democracy in Turkey was of prime importance for the military. 
However, more important of all was to safeguard at the same time the Republican 
ideals like secularism, territorial integrity and nationalism. This concern of the military 
has shaped the relations between themselves and the political parties throughout the 
Republican period Thioughout the 1940s and the 1950s they acted against the 
Democratic Party due to its unconstitutional and authoritarian measures against the 
RPP whose leader- İnönü- was in the eyes of the military a national hero. In the 1960s 
and 1970s the political parties’ tolerance towards the leftist and rightist ideologies 
alienated the military from all since these kind of events were totally in contrast with 
the type of regime .Atatürk wanted to establish in Turkey.
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